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Stability and cooperative solution in stochastic games. / Parilina, Elena M.; Tampieri, Alessandro.

в: Theory and Decision, Том 84, № 4, 2018, стр. 601–625.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Parilina, EM & Tampieri, A 2018, 'Stability and cooperative solution in stochastic games', Theory and Decision, Том. 84, № 4, стр. 601–625. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9619-7

APA

Vancouver

Author

Parilina, Elena M. ; Tampieri, Alessandro. / Stability and cooperative solution in stochastic games. в: Theory and Decision. 2018 ; Том 84, № 4. стр. 601–625.

BibTeX

@article{7092cc081b84421ba94afc20ad0b41f0,
title = "Stability and cooperative solution in stochastic games",
abstract = "This paper analyses the principles of stable cooperation for stochastic games. Starting from the non-cooperative version of a discounted, non zero-sum stochastic game, we build its cooperative form and find the cooperative solution. We then analyse the conditions under which this solution is stable. Principles of stability include subgame consistency, strategic stability and irrational behaviour proof of the cooperative solution. We finally discuss the existence of a stable cooperative solution, and consider a type of stochastic games for which the cooperative solution is found and the principles of stable cooperation are checked.",
keywords = "Cooperative stochastic game, Irrational behaviour proof, Strategic stability, Subgame consistency, Subgame perfect equilibrium",
author = "Parilina, {Elena M.} and Alessandro Tampieri",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/s11238-017-9619-7",
language = "English",
volume = "84",
pages = "601–625",
journal = "Theory and Decision",
issn = "0040-5833",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Stability and cooperative solution in stochastic games

AU - Parilina, Elena M.

AU - Tampieri, Alessandro

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - This paper analyses the principles of stable cooperation for stochastic games. Starting from the non-cooperative version of a discounted, non zero-sum stochastic game, we build its cooperative form and find the cooperative solution. We then analyse the conditions under which this solution is stable. Principles of stability include subgame consistency, strategic stability and irrational behaviour proof of the cooperative solution. We finally discuss the existence of a stable cooperative solution, and consider a type of stochastic games for which the cooperative solution is found and the principles of stable cooperation are checked.

AB - This paper analyses the principles of stable cooperation for stochastic games. Starting from the non-cooperative version of a discounted, non zero-sum stochastic game, we build its cooperative form and find the cooperative solution. We then analyse the conditions under which this solution is stable. Principles of stability include subgame consistency, strategic stability and irrational behaviour proof of the cooperative solution. We finally discuss the existence of a stable cooperative solution, and consider a type of stochastic games for which the cooperative solution is found and the principles of stable cooperation are checked.

KW - Cooperative stochastic game

KW - Irrational behaviour proof

KW - Strategic stability

KW - Subgame consistency

KW - Subgame perfect equilibrium

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85021090406&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11238-017-9619-7

DO - 10.1007/s11238-017-9619-7

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85021090406

VL - 84

SP - 601

EP - 625

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

SN - 0040-5833

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 9169205