Standard

Stability Analysis of Two-Stage Evolutionary SEIRD Model. / Губар, Елена Алексеевна; Лю, Сюсю; Ли, Инь.

в: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 20.07.2026.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Губар, ЕА, Лю, С & Ли, И 2026, 'Stability Analysis of Two-Stage Evolutionary SEIRD Model', Journal of the Operations Research Society of China. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-026-00715-2

APA

Губар, Е. А., Лю, С., & Ли, И. (2026). Stability Analysis of Two-Stage Evolutionary SEIRD Model. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-026-00715-2

Vancouver

Губар ЕА, Лю С, Ли И. Stability Analysis of Two-Stage Evolutionary SEIRD Model. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China. 2026 Июль 20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-026-00715-2

Author

Губар, Елена Алексеевна ; Лю, Сюсю ; Ли, Инь. / Stability Analysis of Two-Stage Evolutionary SEIRD Model. в: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China. 2026.

BibTeX

@article{a6a563c61ae54784a0d81545795925d0,
title = "Stability Analysis of Two-Stage Evolutionary SEIRD Model",
abstract = "Evolutionary games provide a very useful tool for analyzing how agents of population behave during the epidemic outbreak. Based on the fact that in the process of virus spreading, individuals may take different measures to inhibit virus spreading according to the environmental influences, we construct a two-stage evolutionary game process: the first stage is the choice of whether to vaccinate or not before the virus spreads, and the second stage is the process of virus spreading (SEIRD epidemic model). In the epidemic model, we analyze its basic reproduction number, the final epidemic size and the optimal control problem with efficacy of medicine as the control variable. At the level of the evolutionary game, we analyze the existence and stability of its equilibrium points and the effect of R0 on evolutionary stable strategies. Finally, a series of numerical experiments support the theoretical results obtained.",
keywords = "Basic reproduction number, ESS, Epidemics, Evolutionary games, Optimal control",
author = "Губар, {Елена Алексеевна} and Сюсю Лю and Инь Ли",
year = "2026",
month = jul,
day = "20",
doi = "10.1007/s40305-026-00715-2",
language = "English",
journal = "Journal of the Operations Research Society of China",
issn = "2194-668X",
publisher = "Springer Nature",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Stability Analysis of Two-Stage Evolutionary SEIRD Model

AU - Губар, Елена Алексеевна

AU - Лю, Сюсю

AU - Ли, Инь

PY - 2026/7/20

Y1 - 2026/7/20

N2 - Evolutionary games provide a very useful tool for analyzing how agents of population behave during the epidemic outbreak. Based on the fact that in the process of virus spreading, individuals may take different measures to inhibit virus spreading according to the environmental influences, we construct a two-stage evolutionary game process: the first stage is the choice of whether to vaccinate or not before the virus spreads, and the second stage is the process of virus spreading (SEIRD epidemic model). In the epidemic model, we analyze its basic reproduction number, the final epidemic size and the optimal control problem with efficacy of medicine as the control variable. At the level of the evolutionary game, we analyze the existence and stability of its equilibrium points and the effect of R0 on evolutionary stable strategies. Finally, a series of numerical experiments support the theoretical results obtained.

AB - Evolutionary games provide a very useful tool for analyzing how agents of population behave during the epidemic outbreak. Based on the fact that in the process of virus spreading, individuals may take different measures to inhibit virus spreading according to the environmental influences, we construct a two-stage evolutionary game process: the first stage is the choice of whether to vaccinate or not before the virus spreads, and the second stage is the process of virus spreading (SEIRD epidemic model). In the epidemic model, we analyze its basic reproduction number, the final epidemic size and the optimal control problem with efficacy of medicine as the control variable. At the level of the evolutionary game, we analyze the existence and stability of its equilibrium points and the effect of R0 on evolutionary stable strategies. Finally, a series of numerical experiments support the theoretical results obtained.

KW - Basic reproduction number

KW - ESS

KW - Epidemics

KW - Evolutionary games

KW - Optimal control

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/11c0dea6-6d52-37f4-bfb9-aa2625d31bb3/

U2 - 10.1007/s40305-026-00715-2

DO - 10.1007/s40305-026-00715-2

M3 - Article

JO - Journal of the Operations Research Society of China

JF - Journal of the Operations Research Society of China

SN - 2194-668X

ER -

ID: 159463984