Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
Revenue and cost sharing contract in a dynamic closed-loop supply chain with uncertain parameters. / Kuchesfehani, Elnaz Kanani; Parilina, Elena M.; Zaccour, Georges.
в: Annals of Operations Research, Том 322, № 2, 03.2023, стр. 851–877.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Revenue and cost sharing contract in a dynamic closed-loop supply chain with uncertain parameters
AU - Kuchesfehani, Elnaz Kanani
AU - Parilina, Elena M.
AU - Zaccour, Georges
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2023/3
Y1 - 2023/3
N2 - We model a closed-loop supply chain, made up of one manufacturer and one retailer, as a stochastic dynamic game. This paradigm allows us to simultaneously capture the strategic interactions between the agents, the intertemporal nature of the return of past-sold products for remanufacturing, and the uncertainty in the parameter values. We characterize and compare the solutions in two scenarios. In the no-sharing scenario, we assume that the manufacturer alone incurs the cost of the green activities aimed at incentivizing consumers to return previously purchased products at the end of their useful life. In the second scenario, namely, revenue and cost sharing contract, the retailer shares the cost of the green activities and the manufacturer transfers part of its revenues to the retailer. Numerical experiments are discussed.
AB - We model a closed-loop supply chain, made up of one manufacturer and one retailer, as a stochastic dynamic game. This paradigm allows us to simultaneously capture the strategic interactions between the agents, the intertemporal nature of the return of past-sold products for remanufacturing, and the uncertainty in the parameter values. We characterize and compare the solutions in two scenarios. In the no-sharing scenario, we assume that the manufacturer alone incurs the cost of the green activities aimed at incentivizing consumers to return previously purchased products at the end of their useful life. In the second scenario, namely, revenue and cost sharing contract, the retailer shares the cost of the green activities and the manufacturer transfers part of its revenues to the retailer. Numerical experiments are discussed.
KW - Closed-loop supply chain
KW - Dynamic games
KW - Green activities
KW - Product returns
KW - Revenue sharing contract
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85141471442&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/9c92868a-0220-365e-ba9f-8776a3ce15f1/
U2 - 10.1007/s10479-022-05055-x
DO - 10.1007/s10479-022-05055-x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85141471442
VL - 322
SP - 851
EP - 877
JO - Annals of Operations Research
JF - Annals of Operations Research
SN - 0254-5330
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 100333987