Standard

Properties of solutions of positional games with incomplete information. / Kuzyutin, D. V.

в: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International, Том 34, № 1, 01.01.1996, стр. 157-162.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Kuzyutin, DV 1996, 'Properties of solutions of positional games with incomplete information', Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International, Том. 34, № 1, стр. 157-162.

APA

Kuzyutin, D. V. (1996). Properties of solutions of positional games with incomplete information. Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International, 34(1), 157-162.

Vancouver

Kuzyutin DV. Properties of solutions of positional games with incomplete information. Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International. 1996 Янв. 1;34(1):157-162.

Author

Kuzyutin, D. V. / Properties of solutions of positional games with incomplete information. в: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International. 1996 ; Том 34, № 1. стр. 157-162.

BibTeX

@article{daa8706fc27f4126be98a56cd93c5e99,
title = "Properties of solutions of positional games with incomplete information",
abstract = "The dynamic stability of solutions in the class of mixed strategies is investigated for a certain class of positional games with incomplete information. The following optimality conditions are examined: Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium, and K-equilibrium.",
author = "Kuzyutin, {D. V.}",
year = "1996",
month = jan,
day = "1",
language = "English",
volume = "34",
pages = "157--162",
journal = "Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International",
issn = "1064-2307",
publisher = "МАИК {"}Наука/Интерпериодика{"}",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Properties of solutions of positional games with incomplete information

AU - Kuzyutin, D. V.

PY - 1996/1/1

Y1 - 1996/1/1

N2 - The dynamic stability of solutions in the class of mixed strategies is investigated for a certain class of positional games with incomplete information. The following optimality conditions are examined: Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium, and K-equilibrium.

AB - The dynamic stability of solutions in the class of mixed strategies is investigated for a certain class of positional games with incomplete information. The following optimality conditions are examined: Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium, and K-equilibrium.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0029735183&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0029735183

VL - 34

SP - 157

EP - 162

JO - Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International

JF - Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International

SN - 1064-2307

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 38628698