DOI

We understand a solution of a cooperative TU-game as the α-prenucleoli set, α ∈ R, which is a generalization of the notion of the [0, 1]-prenucleolus. We show that the set of all α-nucleoli takes into account the constructive power with the weight α and the blocking power with the weight (1 − α) for all possible values of the parameter α. The further generalization of the solution by introducing two independent parameters makes no sense. We prove that the set of all α-prenucleoli satisfies properties of duality and independence with respect to the excess arrangement. For the considered solution we extend the covariance propertywith respect to strategically equivalent transformations.

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Страницы (с-по)63-74
Число страниц12
ЖурналRussian Mathematics
Том60
Номер выпуска6
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 1 июн 2016

    Предметные области Scopus

  • Математика (все)

ID: 9659089