Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
Political economy of dynamic resource wars. / van der Ploeg, Frederick.
в: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Том 92, 01.11.2018, стр. 765-782.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Political economy of dynamic resource wars
AU - van der Ploeg, Frederick
PY - 2018/11/1
Y1 - 2018/11/1
N2 - The political economy of exhaustible resource extraction is analysed in three contexts. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of being removed once and for all by a rival faction, extraction becomes more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, perennial political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or the partisan in-office bias is large and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if constitutional cohesiveness is weak, the incumbent has a partisan in-office bias, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, governments can be less frequently removed from office, and fighting technology has less decreasing returns to scale. Resource depletion in such wars is more rapacious if there is more government instability, the political system is less cohesive, and the partisan in-office bias is smaller.
AB - The political economy of exhaustible resource extraction is analysed in three contexts. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of being removed once and for all by a rival faction, extraction becomes more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, perennial political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or the partisan in-office bias is large and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if constitutional cohesiveness is weak, the incumbent has a partisan in-office bias, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, governments can be less frequently removed from office, and fighting technology has less decreasing returns to scale. Resource depletion in such wars is more rapacious if there is more government instability, the political system is less cohesive, and the partisan in-office bias is smaller.
KW - Cohesiveness
KW - Contests
KW - D81
KW - Dynamic resource wars
KW - Exploitation investment
KW - H20
KW - Hold-up problem
KW - Partisan bias
KW - Political conflict
KW - Q31
KW - Q38
KW - Rapacious depletion
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85032033045&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.09.002
DO - 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.09.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85032033045
VL - 92
SP - 765
EP - 782
JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
JF - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
SN - 0095-0696
ER -
ID: 37778195