TY - CONF

T1 - Optimal Arrivals to Preemptive Queueing System

AU - Mazalov, Vladimir V.

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - This paper considers a single-server queueing system with strategic users in which customers (players) enter the system with preemptive access. As soon as the customer request enters the system, the server immediately starts the service. But when the next request arrives in the system, the previous one leaves the system even he has not finished his service yet. We study the following non-cooperative game for this service system. Each player decides when to arrive at the queueing system within a certain period of time. The objective of the player is to maximize the probability of receiving service. We show that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in this game. Finally, some numerical experiments are carried out to compare the equilibria under different values of the model parameters.

AB - This paper considers a single-server queueing system with strategic users in which customers (players) enter the system with preemptive access. As soon as the customer request enters the system, the server immediately starts the service. But when the next request arrives in the system, the previous one leaves the system even he has not finished his service yet. We study the following non-cooperative game for this service system. Each player decides when to arrive at the queueing system within a certain period of time. The objective of the player is to maximize the probability of receiving service. We show that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in this game. Finally, some numerical experiments are carried out to compare the equilibria under different values of the model parameters.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-09607-5_12

DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-09607-5_12

M3 - материалы

SP - 169

EP - 181

Y2 - 2 July 2022 through 6 July 2022

ER -