TY - JOUR

T1 - Opinion dynamics game in conservation discourse

AU - Кареева, Юлия Сергеевна

AU - Седаков, Артем Александрович

PY - 2026/2/1

Y1 - 2026/2/1

N2 - Understanding the dynamics of opinion formation in conservation discourse is critical for reconciling conflicting economic and ecological priorities, as competing narratives directly shape policy effectiveness. Contemporary conservation discourse reflects a spectrum of strategic engagements between corporations and environmental organizations, ranging from adversarial positioning to collaborative partnerships. These relationships directly affect how opinions are formed and evolve within the professional conservation community, thereby influencing conservation discourse itself. This study examines these dynamics through an integrated analytical framework, combining game-theoretic approaches with opinion dynamics models to examine three interaction scenarios between corporations and environmental organizations: direct conflict, value-aligned compromise, and partial compromise with divergent value systems. We derive both Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal (Nash bargaining) solutions to characterize strategic outcomes under each scenario. The analysis utilizes publicly available data on professional collaboration networks and sociological survey findings, offering a comprehensive empirical foundation. In the direct conflict scenario, entities exhibit increased strategic polarization, striving to steer the discourse in their favor. In the compromise scenarios, the prevailing initial opinion within the professional community plays a significant role in shaping the actions of the entities, which align their strategies with public perspectives. Our results also show that environmental organizations tend to dominate conservation discourse due to the community’s preference for conservation-oriented values, while corporations face challenges in mobilizing supporters.

AB - Understanding the dynamics of opinion formation in conservation discourse is critical for reconciling conflicting economic and ecological priorities, as competing narratives directly shape policy effectiveness. Contemporary conservation discourse reflects a spectrum of strategic engagements between corporations and environmental organizations, ranging from adversarial positioning to collaborative partnerships. These relationships directly affect how opinions are formed and evolve within the professional conservation community, thereby influencing conservation discourse itself. This study examines these dynamics through an integrated analytical framework, combining game-theoretic approaches with opinion dynamics models to examine three interaction scenarios between corporations and environmental organizations: direct conflict, value-aligned compromise, and partial compromise with divergent value systems. We derive both Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal (Nash bargaining) solutions to characterize strategic outcomes under each scenario. The analysis utilizes publicly available data on professional collaboration networks and sociological survey findings, offering a comprehensive empirical foundation. In the direct conflict scenario, entities exhibit increased strategic polarization, striving to steer the discourse in their favor. In the compromise scenarios, the prevailing initial opinion within the professional community plays a significant role in shaping the actions of the entities, which align their strategies with public perspectives. Our results also show that environmental organizations tend to dominate conservation discourse due to the community’s preference for conservation-oriented values, while corporations face challenges in mobilizing supporters.

KW - Conservation

KW - Friedkin–Johnsen model

KW - Game theory

KW - Opinion dynamics

KW - Social networks

KW - Strategic influence

UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42001-025-00430-7

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/f1207808-dda8-3a57-b541-28e33d51187a/

U2 - 10.1007/s42001-025-00430-7

DO - 10.1007/s42001-025-00430-7

M3 - Article

VL - 9

JO - Journal of Computational Social Science

JF - Journal of Computational Social Science

SN - 2432-2717

IS - 1

M1 - 12

ER -