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On Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Hierarchical Games. / Pankratova, Yaroslavna ; Petrosyan, Leon .

Stability and Control Processes : Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov. Springer Nature, 2022. стр. 447-455 ( Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences - Proceedings).

Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › статья в сборнике материалов конференции › научная › Рецензирование

Harvard

Pankratova, Y & Petrosyan, L 2022, On Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Hierarchical Games. в Stability and Control Processes : Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences - Proceedings, Springer Nature, стр. 447-455, Stability and Control Processes, Saint Petersburg, Российская Федерация, 5/10/20. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87966-2_49

APA

Pankratova, Y., & Petrosyan, L. (2022). On Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Hierarchical Games. в Stability and Control Processes : Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov (стр. 447-455). ( Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences - Proceedings). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87966-2_49

Vancouver

Pankratova Y, Petrosyan L. On Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Hierarchical Games. в Stability and Control Processes : Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov. Springer Nature. 2022. стр. 447-455. ( Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences - Proceedings). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87966-2_49

Author

Pankratova, Yaroslavna ; Petrosyan, Leon . / On Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Hierarchical Games. Stability and Control Processes : Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov. Springer Nature, 2022. стр. 447-455 ( Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences - Proceedings).

BibTeX

@inproceedings{d7f0cf414e7b4ba8befe28487965c77c,
title = "On Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Hierarchical Games",
abstract = "In the paper, non-cooperative and cooperative versions of repeated rhomboidal games with hierarchical structure are investigated. In non-cooperative case as solution concept the Nash Equilibrium is considered. Moreover, a special subclass of Nash equilibrium, based on threat and punishment strategies, is derived. Additionally, we compute the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS).",
author = "Yaroslavna Pankratova and Leon Petrosyan",
note = "Pankratova, Y., Petrosyan, L. (2022). On Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Hierarchical Games. In: Smirnov, N., Golovkina, A. (eds) Stability and Control Processes. SCP 2020. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences - Proceedings. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87966-2_49; Stability and Control Processes: International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov : Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov, SCP2020 ; Conference date: 05-10-2020 Through 09-10-2020",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-87966-2_49",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-030-87965-5",
series = " Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences - Proceedings",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
pages = "447--455",
booktitle = "Stability and Control Processes",
address = "Germany",
url = "http://www.apmath.spbu.ru/scp2020/, http://www.apmath.spbu.ru/scp2020/ru/main/, http://www.apmath.spbu.ru/scp2020/eng/program/#schedule, https://link.springer.com/conference/scp",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - On Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Hierarchical Games

AU - Pankratova, Yaroslavna

AU - Petrosyan, Leon

N1 - Conference code: 4

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - In the paper, non-cooperative and cooperative versions of repeated rhomboidal games with hierarchical structure are investigated. In non-cooperative case as solution concept the Nash Equilibrium is considered. Moreover, a special subclass of Nash equilibrium, based on threat and punishment strategies, is derived. Additionally, we compute the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS).

AB - In the paper, non-cooperative and cooperative versions of repeated rhomboidal games with hierarchical structure are investigated. In non-cooperative case as solution concept the Nash Equilibrium is considered. Moreover, a special subclass of Nash equilibrium, based on threat and punishment strategies, is derived. Additionally, we compute the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS).

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/caacf5e3-09da-395f-ad74-964f25330c13/

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-87966-2_49

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-87966-2_49

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 978-3-030-87965-5

T3 - Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences - Proceedings

SP - 447

EP - 455

BT - Stability and Control Processes

PB - Springer Nature

T2 - Stability and Control Processes: International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov

Y2 - 5 October 2020 through 9 October 2020

ER -

ID: 95497995