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Non-Renewable Resource Extraction Model with Uncertainties. / Е, Пэйчэнь; Тур, Анна Викторовна; Ву, Ийлунь.

в: Games, Том 16, № 5, 52, 09.10.2025.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданияхстатьяРецензирование

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@article{54ed71d86fd94cdebe3a2a0eb95afd43,
title = "Non-Renewable Resource Extraction Model with Uncertainties",
abstract = "This paper delves into a multi-player non-renewable resource extraction differential game model, where the duration of the game is a random variable with a composite distribution function. We first explore the conditions under which the cooperative solution also constitutes a Nash equilibrium, thereby extending the theoretical framework from a fixed duration to the more complex and realistic setting of random duration. Assuming that players are unaware of the switching moment of the distribution function, we derive optimal estimates in both time-dependent and state-dependent cases. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of strategic decision-making in resource extraction under uncertainty and have implications for various fields where random durations and cooperative strategies are relevant.",
keywords = "differential game, minimax problem, non-renewable resource extraction, random duration, uncertainty",
author = "Пэйчэнь Е and Тур, {Анна Викторовна} and Ийлунь Ву",
year = "2025",
month = oct,
day = "9",
doi = "10.3390/g16050052",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
journal = "Games",
issn = "2073-4336",
publisher = "MDPI AG",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Non-Renewable Resource Extraction Model with Uncertainties

AU - Е, Пэйчэнь

AU - Тур, Анна Викторовна

AU - Ву, Ийлунь

PY - 2025/10/9

Y1 - 2025/10/9

N2 - This paper delves into a multi-player non-renewable resource extraction differential game model, where the duration of the game is a random variable with a composite distribution function. We first explore the conditions under which the cooperative solution also constitutes a Nash equilibrium, thereby extending the theoretical framework from a fixed duration to the more complex and realistic setting of random duration. Assuming that players are unaware of the switching moment of the distribution function, we derive optimal estimates in both time-dependent and state-dependent cases. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of strategic decision-making in resource extraction under uncertainty and have implications for various fields where random durations and cooperative strategies are relevant.

AB - This paper delves into a multi-player non-renewable resource extraction differential game model, where the duration of the game is a random variable with a composite distribution function. We first explore the conditions under which the cooperative solution also constitutes a Nash equilibrium, thereby extending the theoretical framework from a fixed duration to the more complex and realistic setting of random duration. Assuming that players are unaware of the switching moment of the distribution function, we derive optimal estimates in both time-dependent and state-dependent cases. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of strategic decision-making in resource extraction under uncertainty and have implications for various fields where random durations and cooperative strategies are relevant.

KW - differential game

KW - minimax problem

KW - non-renewable resource extraction

KW - random duration

KW - uncertainty

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/5170cfe5-9a3d-3f6f-8e0b-548b4c2b35b2/

U2 - 10.3390/g16050052

DO - 10.3390/g16050052

M3 - Article

VL - 16

JO - Games

JF - Games

SN - 2073-4336

IS - 5

M1 - 52

ER -

ID: 142289884