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Node-consistent core for games played over event trees. / Parilina, E.; Zaccour, G.

в: Automatica, Том 53, 2015, стр. 304-311.

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Parilina, E. ; Zaccour, G. / Node-consistent core for games played over event trees. в: Automatica. 2015 ; Том 53. стр. 304-311.

BibTeX

@article{b64b95c2f42b4d6f8474e0ea013969ec,
title = "Node-consistent core for games played over event trees",
abstract = "We consider a class of dynamic games played over an event tree, where the players cooperate to optimize their expected joint payoff. Assuming that the players adopt the core as the solution concept of the cooperative game, we devise a node-decomposition of the imputations in the core such that each player finds it individually rational at each node to stick to cooperation rather than switching to a noncooperative strategy. We illustrate our approach with an example of pollution control.",
keywords = "Stochastic games, S-adapted strategies, Imputation distribution procedure, Core, Time-consistency, Node-consistency, Nucleolus",
author = "E. Parilina and G. Zaccour",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1016/j.automatica.2015.01.007",
language = "English",
volume = "53",
pages = "304--311",
journal = "Automatica",
issn = "0005-1098",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Node-consistent core for games played over event trees

AU - Parilina, E.

AU - Zaccour, G.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - We consider a class of dynamic games played over an event tree, where the players cooperate to optimize their expected joint payoff. Assuming that the players adopt the core as the solution concept of the cooperative game, we devise a node-decomposition of the imputations in the core such that each player finds it individually rational at each node to stick to cooperation rather than switching to a noncooperative strategy. We illustrate our approach with an example of pollution control.

AB - We consider a class of dynamic games played over an event tree, where the players cooperate to optimize their expected joint payoff. Assuming that the players adopt the core as the solution concept of the cooperative game, we devise a node-decomposition of the imputations in the core such that each player finds it individually rational at each node to stick to cooperation rather than switching to a noncooperative strategy. We illustrate our approach with an example of pollution control.

KW - Stochastic games

KW - S-adapted strategies

KW - Imputation distribution procedure

KW - Core

KW - Time-consistency

KW - Node-consistency

KW - Nucleolus

U2 - 10.1016/j.automatica.2015.01.007

DO - 10.1016/j.automatica.2015.01.007

M3 - Article

VL - 53

SP - 304

EP - 311

JO - Automatica

JF - Automatica

SN - 0005-1098

ER -

ID: 3927127