Standard

Location–Price Competition in Mobile Operator Market. / Mazalov, Vladimir; Lukyanenko, Andrey; Gurtov, Andrei.

в: International Game Theory Review, Том 21, № 03, 1850015, 2019.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Mazalov, V, Lukyanenko, A & Gurtov, A 2019, 'Location–Price Competition in Mobile Operator Market', International Game Theory Review, Том. 21, № 03, 1850015. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198918500159

APA

Mazalov, V., Lukyanenko, A., & Gurtov, A. (2019). Location–Price Competition in Mobile Operator Market. International Game Theory Review, 21(03), [1850015]. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198918500159

Vancouver

Mazalov V, Lukyanenko A, Gurtov A. Location–Price Competition in Mobile Operator Market. International Game Theory Review. 2019;21(03). 1850015. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198918500159

Author

Mazalov, Vladimir ; Lukyanenko, Andrey ; Gurtov, Andrei. / Location–Price Competition in Mobile Operator Market. в: International Game Theory Review. 2019 ; Том 21, № 03.

BibTeX

@article{cd36eedb55ce45b58ef4cc2da657dcdd,
title = "Location–Price Competition in Mobile Operator Market",
abstract = "In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model of the mobile network market. The market is presented by three sides: primary mobile network operators (MNO), mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) and consumers of the services. MVNO are mobile operators without their own infrastructure. They buy resources from MNO and compete with other MVNO for the consumers selling a service in the mobile network market. We construct a two-stage game. In the first stage, MVNO (players) select the MNO, one or several, and then announce the price for their service for the consumers in this MNO. After the profile of prices is determined, the consumers are distributed among MVNOs following the logistic function. The equilibrium in this two-stage game is constructed. For identical consumers, the analytic formulas for the solution are derived.",
author = "Vladimir Mazalov and Andrey Lukyanenko and Andrei Gurtov",
note = "doi: 10.1142/S0219198918500159",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1142/S0219198918500159",
language = "русский",
volume = "21",
journal = "International Game Theory Review",
issn = "0219-1989",
publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",
number = "03",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Location–Price Competition in Mobile Operator Market

AU - Mazalov, Vladimir

AU - Lukyanenko, Andrey

AU - Gurtov, Andrei

N1 - doi: 10.1142/S0219198918500159

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model of the mobile network market. The market is presented by three sides: primary mobile network operators (MNO), mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) and consumers of the services. MVNO are mobile operators without their own infrastructure. They buy resources from MNO and compete with other MVNO for the consumers selling a service in the mobile network market. We construct a two-stage game. In the first stage, MVNO (players) select the MNO, one or several, and then announce the price for their service for the consumers in this MNO. After the profile of prices is determined, the consumers are distributed among MVNOs following the logistic function. The equilibrium in this two-stage game is constructed. For identical consumers, the analytic formulas for the solution are derived.

AB - In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model of the mobile network market. The market is presented by three sides: primary mobile network operators (MNO), mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) and consumers of the services. MVNO are mobile operators without their own infrastructure. They buy resources from MNO and compete with other MVNO for the consumers selling a service in the mobile network market. We construct a two-stage game. In the first stage, MVNO (players) select the MNO, one or several, and then announce the price for their service for the consumers in this MNO. After the profile of prices is determined, the consumers are distributed among MVNOs following the logistic function. The equilibrium in this two-stage game is constructed. For identical consumers, the analytic formulas for the solution are derived.

U2 - 10.1142/S0219198918500159

DO - 10.1142/S0219198918500159

M3 - статья

VL - 21

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

IS - 03

M1 - 1850015

ER -

ID: 134636830