Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
Is Searlean Insincere Promise a Speech Act? / Ogleznev, Vitaly.
в: Filosofija, Sociologija, Том 30, № 3, 2019, стр. 215-223.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Is Searlean Insincere Promise a Speech Act?
AU - Ogleznev, Vitaly
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - In this article, I focus solely on the study of the classical definition of the speech act of promising given in the works of John Searle. In the first section, I consider the conditions and rules for the successful performance of the act of promising. The second section includes an analysis of some contradictions in Searle's approach to the insincere promise. I discuss his basic argument that insincere promises are speech acts. The third section deals with the case of a polite promise. The fourth section presents a refutation of Searle's claim to recognize an insincere promise as a promise and a speech act. In the last section, I conclude that for the 'normal' speech act of promising, the requirement of the sincerity condition 'S intends to do A' is necessary; otherwise it is not a promise at all, and thus the Searlean insincere promise is not a speech act.
AB - In this article, I focus solely on the study of the classical definition of the speech act of promising given in the works of John Searle. In the first section, I consider the conditions and rules for the successful performance of the act of promising. The second section includes an analysis of some contradictions in Searle's approach to the insincere promise. I discuss his basic argument that insincere promises are speech acts. The third section deals with the case of a polite promise. The fourth section presents a refutation of Searle's claim to recognize an insincere promise as a promise and a speech act. In the last section, I conclude that for the 'normal' speech act of promising, the requirement of the sincerity condition 'S intends to do A' is necessary; otherwise it is not a promise at all, and thus the Searlean insincere promise is not a speech act.
KW - Insincere promise
KW - Obligation
KW - Sincerity condition
KW - Speech act
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85073429900&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.6001/fil-soc.v30i3.4044
DO - 10.6001/fil-soc.v30i3.4044
M3 - статья
AN - SCOPUS:85073429900
VL - 30
SP - 215
EP - 223
JO - Filosofija, Sociologija
JF - Filosofija, Sociologija
SN - 0235-7186
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 48883268