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Infinite horizon dynamic games : A new approach via information updating. / Yeung, David; Petrosian, Ovanes.

Game Theoretic Analysis. WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD, 2019. стр. 69-91.

Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаяРецензирование

Harvard

Yeung, D & Petrosian, O 2019, Infinite horizon dynamic games: A new approach via information updating. в Game Theoretic Analysis. WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD, стр. 69-91.

APA

Yeung, D., & Petrosian, O. (2019). Infinite horizon dynamic games: A new approach via information updating. в Game Theoretic Analysis (стр. 69-91). WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD.

Vancouver

Yeung D, Petrosian O. Infinite horizon dynamic games: A new approach via information updating. в Game Theoretic Analysis. WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD. 2019. стр. 69-91

Author

Yeung, David ; Petrosian, Ovanes. / Infinite horizon dynamic games : A new approach via information updating. Game Theoretic Analysis. WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD, 2019. стр. 69-91

BibTeX

@inbook{2bda1bdb48284866af19d1d05c6e79f8,
title = "Infinite horizon dynamic games: A new approach via information updating",
abstract = "This chapter formulates a new approach to analyze infinite horizon dynamic games with uncertainties and unknowns in the players' future payoff structures. In many game situations, the game horizon would last for an indefinitely long period and one has to consider them as infinite horizon games. Existing infinite horizon dynamic games often rely on the assumption of time-invariant game structures for the derivation of equilibrium solutions. However, many events in the considerably far future are intrinsically unknown. In this chapter, information about the players' future payoffs will be revealed as the game proceeds. Making use of the newly obtained information, the players revise their strategies accordingly, and the process will continue indefinitely. This new approach for the analysis of infinite horizon dynamic games via information updating provides a more realistic and practical alternative to the study of infinite horizon dynamic games.",
keywords = "Dynamic games, Infinite game horizon, Information updating, Uncertain payoff structures",
author = "David Yeung and Ovanes Petrosian",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved.",
year = "2019",
month = oct,
day = "14",
language = "English",
isbn = "9789811202001",
pages = "69--91",
booktitle = "Game Theoretic Analysis",
publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",
address = "Singapore",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Infinite horizon dynamic games

T2 - A new approach via information updating

AU - Yeung, David

AU - Petrosian, Ovanes

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved.

PY - 2019/10/14

Y1 - 2019/10/14

N2 - This chapter formulates a new approach to analyze infinite horizon dynamic games with uncertainties and unknowns in the players' future payoff structures. In many game situations, the game horizon would last for an indefinitely long period and one has to consider them as infinite horizon games. Existing infinite horizon dynamic games often rely on the assumption of time-invariant game structures for the derivation of equilibrium solutions. However, many events in the considerably far future are intrinsically unknown. In this chapter, information about the players' future payoffs will be revealed as the game proceeds. Making use of the newly obtained information, the players revise their strategies accordingly, and the process will continue indefinitely. This new approach for the analysis of infinite horizon dynamic games via information updating provides a more realistic and practical alternative to the study of infinite horizon dynamic games.

AB - This chapter formulates a new approach to analyze infinite horizon dynamic games with uncertainties and unknowns in the players' future payoff structures. In many game situations, the game horizon would last for an indefinitely long period and one has to consider them as infinite horizon games. Existing infinite horizon dynamic games often rely on the assumption of time-invariant game structures for the derivation of equilibrium solutions. However, many events in the considerably far future are intrinsically unknown. In this chapter, information about the players' future payoffs will be revealed as the game proceeds. Making use of the newly obtained information, the players revise their strategies accordingly, and the process will continue indefinitely. This new approach for the analysis of infinite horizon dynamic games via information updating provides a more realistic and practical alternative to the study of infinite horizon dynamic games.

KW - Dynamic games

KW - Infinite game horizon

KW - Information updating

KW - Uncertain payoff structures

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85122226588&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85122226588

SN - 9789811202001

SP - 69

EP - 91

BT - Game Theoretic Analysis

PB - WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD

ER -

ID: 91928658