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Infinite horizon dynamic games : A new approach via information updating. / Yeung, David; Petrosian, Ovanes.
Game Theoretic Analysis. WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD, 2019. стр. 69-91.Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел › научная › Рецензирование
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TY - CHAP
T1 - Infinite horizon dynamic games
T2 - A new approach via information updating
AU - Yeung, David
AU - Petrosian, Ovanes
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved.
PY - 2019/10/14
Y1 - 2019/10/14
N2 - This chapter formulates a new approach to analyze infinite horizon dynamic games with uncertainties and unknowns in the players' future payoff structures. In many game situations, the game horizon would last for an indefinitely long period and one has to consider them as infinite horizon games. Existing infinite horizon dynamic games often rely on the assumption of time-invariant game structures for the derivation of equilibrium solutions. However, many events in the considerably far future are intrinsically unknown. In this chapter, information about the players' future payoffs will be revealed as the game proceeds. Making use of the newly obtained information, the players revise their strategies accordingly, and the process will continue indefinitely. This new approach for the analysis of infinite horizon dynamic games via information updating provides a more realistic and practical alternative to the study of infinite horizon dynamic games.
AB - This chapter formulates a new approach to analyze infinite horizon dynamic games with uncertainties and unknowns in the players' future payoff structures. In many game situations, the game horizon would last for an indefinitely long period and one has to consider them as infinite horizon games. Existing infinite horizon dynamic games often rely on the assumption of time-invariant game structures for the derivation of equilibrium solutions. However, many events in the considerably far future are intrinsically unknown. In this chapter, information about the players' future payoffs will be revealed as the game proceeds. Making use of the newly obtained information, the players revise their strategies accordingly, and the process will continue indefinitely. This new approach for the analysis of infinite horizon dynamic games via information updating provides a more realistic and practical alternative to the study of infinite horizon dynamic games.
KW - Dynamic games
KW - Infinite game horizon
KW - Information updating
KW - Uncertain payoff structures
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85122226588&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85122226588
SN - 9789811202001
SP - 69
EP - 91
BT - Game Theoretic Analysis
PB - WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD
ER -
ID: 91928658