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Hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium: existence and characterization. / Сунь, Пин; Парилина, Елена Михайловна.

в: International Journal of Game Theory, Том 54, № 1, 5, 01.06.2025.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданияхстатьяРецензирование

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Сунь, Пин ; Парилина, Елена Михайловна. / Hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium: existence and characterization. в: International Journal of Game Theory. 2025 ; Том 54, № 1.

BibTeX

@article{7f2415593bcf40adab01a360265df477,
title = "Hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium: existence and characterization",
abstract = "In this paper, we propose a new equilibrium concept, hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium (HAN equilibrium), which captures the heterogeneity of a set of players in terms of their relations to other players. We assume that the set of players is partitioned into two subsets: individually rational and altruistic players. An individually rational player maximizes her own payoff and an altruistic player behaves individually supporting other players, thus maximizing other players{\textquoteright} payoffs. We characterize the set of hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibria relative to a given partition of players. Existence conditions are provided. Additionally, we discuss the connection of the hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium with other equilibrium concepts and provide several examples to support theoretical results.",
keywords = "Existence theorem, Heterogeneous players, Hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium, Unilateral support equilibrium",
author = "Пин Сунь and Парилина, {Елена Михайловна}",
year = "2025",
month = jun,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s00182-025-00926-6",
language = "English",
volume = "54",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium: existence and characterization

AU - Сунь, Пин

AU - Парилина, Елена Михайловна

PY - 2025/6/1

Y1 - 2025/6/1

N2 - In this paper, we propose a new equilibrium concept, hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium (HAN equilibrium), which captures the heterogeneity of a set of players in terms of their relations to other players. We assume that the set of players is partitioned into two subsets: individually rational and altruistic players. An individually rational player maximizes her own payoff and an altruistic player behaves individually supporting other players, thus maximizing other players’ payoffs. We characterize the set of hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibria relative to a given partition of players. Existence conditions are provided. Additionally, we discuss the connection of the hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium with other equilibrium concepts and provide several examples to support theoretical results.

AB - In this paper, we propose a new equilibrium concept, hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium (HAN equilibrium), which captures the heterogeneity of a set of players in terms of their relations to other players. We assume that the set of players is partitioned into two subsets: individually rational and altruistic players. An individually rational player maximizes her own payoff and an altruistic player behaves individually supporting other players, thus maximizing other players’ payoffs. We characterize the set of hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibria relative to a given partition of players. Existence conditions are provided. Additionally, we discuss the connection of the hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium with other equilibrium concepts and provide several examples to support theoretical results.

KW - Existence theorem

KW - Heterogeneous players

KW - Hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium

KW - Unilateral support equilibrium

UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-025-00926-6

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/72a598b6-db3c-30c9-96e3-41667a5c2b8f/

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-025-00926-6

DO - 10.1007/s00182-025-00926-6

M3 - Article

VL - 54

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 1

M1 - 5

ER -

ID: 133466490