Standard

Generalized dynamic games with durable strategies under uncertain planning horizon. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

в: Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics, Том 395, 113595, 15.10.2021.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Yeung, DWK & Petrosyan, LA 2021, 'Generalized dynamic games with durable strategies under uncertain planning horizon', Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics, Том. 395, 113595. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cam.2021.113595

APA

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2021). Generalized dynamic games with durable strategies under uncertain planning horizon. Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics, 395, [113595]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cam.2021.113595

Vancouver

Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA. Generalized dynamic games with durable strategies under uncertain planning horizon. Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics. 2021 Окт. 15;395. 113595. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cam.2021.113595

Author

Yeung, David W.K. ; Petrosyan, Leon A. / Generalized dynamic games with durable strategies under uncertain planning horizon. в: Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics. 2021 ; Том 395.

BibTeX

@article{26635a8243ae480aa894c58e3026864d,
title = "Generalized dynamic games with durable strategies under uncertain planning horizon",
abstract = "This paper establishes a new class of dynamic games which incorporates two frequently observed real-life phenomena — durable strategies and uncertain horizon. In the presence of durable strategies and random horizon, significant modification of the dynamic optimization techniques is required to accommodate these phenomena. A novel dynamic optimization theorem is developed and a new set of equations characterizing a non-cooperative game equilibrium is derived. A subgame consistent solution for the cooperative game counterpart is obtained with a new theorem for the derivation of a payoff distribution procedure under random horizon and durable strategies. A number of new application results in dynamic games are derived to reflect practical considerations in making decision. Computational illustrations in an application involving a dynamic interactive investments game are provided.",
keywords = "Durable strategies, Dynamic games, Dynamic optimization, Non-cooperative game equilibrium, Random horizon, Subgame consistent solution, NUMERICAL-SOLUTION, LAGS, MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE, SYSTEMS",
author = "Yeung, {David W.K.} and Petrosyan, {Leon A.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Elsevier B.V. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2021",
month = oct,
day = "15",
doi = "10.1016/j.cam.2021.113595",
language = "English",
volume = "395",
journal = "Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics",
issn = "0377-0427",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Generalized dynamic games with durable strategies under uncertain planning horizon

AU - Yeung, David W.K.

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Elsevier B.V. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2021/10/15

Y1 - 2021/10/15

N2 - This paper establishes a new class of dynamic games which incorporates two frequently observed real-life phenomena — durable strategies and uncertain horizon. In the presence of durable strategies and random horizon, significant modification of the dynamic optimization techniques is required to accommodate these phenomena. A novel dynamic optimization theorem is developed and a new set of equations characterizing a non-cooperative game equilibrium is derived. A subgame consistent solution for the cooperative game counterpart is obtained with a new theorem for the derivation of a payoff distribution procedure under random horizon and durable strategies. A number of new application results in dynamic games are derived to reflect practical considerations in making decision. Computational illustrations in an application involving a dynamic interactive investments game are provided.

AB - This paper establishes a new class of dynamic games which incorporates two frequently observed real-life phenomena — durable strategies and uncertain horizon. In the presence of durable strategies and random horizon, significant modification of the dynamic optimization techniques is required to accommodate these phenomena. A novel dynamic optimization theorem is developed and a new set of equations characterizing a non-cooperative game equilibrium is derived. A subgame consistent solution for the cooperative game counterpart is obtained with a new theorem for the derivation of a payoff distribution procedure under random horizon and durable strategies. A number of new application results in dynamic games are derived to reflect practical considerations in making decision. Computational illustrations in an application involving a dynamic interactive investments game are provided.

KW - Durable strategies

KW - Dynamic games

KW - Dynamic optimization

KW - Non-cooperative game equilibrium

KW - Random horizon

KW - Subgame consistent solution

KW - NUMERICAL-SOLUTION

KW - LAGS

KW - MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE

KW - SYSTEMS

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85104674782&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.cam.2021.113595

DO - 10.1016/j.cam.2021.113595

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85104674782

VL - 395

JO - Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics

JF - Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics

SN - 0377-0427

M1 - 113595

ER -

ID: 76959431