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Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Project Management Contract. / Zenkevich, N. A.; Sokolov, Y.; Fattakhova, M. V.

в: Automation and Remote Control, Том 81, № 11, ISSN 0005-1179, 11.2020, стр. 2094-2107.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Zenkevich, NA, Sokolov, Y & Fattakhova, MV 2020, 'Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Project Management Contract', Automation and Remote Control, Том. 81, № 11, ISSN 0005-1179, стр. 2094-2107. https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117920110107

APA

Zenkevich, N. A., Sokolov, Y., & Fattakhova, M. V. (2020). Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Project Management Contract. Automation and Remote Control, 81(11), 2094-2107. [ISSN 0005-1179]. https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117920110107

Vancouver

Zenkevich NA, Sokolov Y, Fattakhova MV. Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Project Management Contract. Automation and Remote Control. 2020 Нояб.;81(11):2094-2107. ISSN 0005-1179. https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117920110107

Author

Zenkevich, N. A. ; Sokolov, Y. ; Fattakhova, M. V. / Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Project Management Contract. в: Automation and Remote Control. 2020 ; Том 81, № 11. стр. 2094-2107.

BibTeX

@article{14f41101bdc94c2cbb96b1a1eb39f484,
title = "Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Project Management Contract",
abstract = "The paper considers two-stage game-theoretic models of the project management contract with a random duration of tasks. In the first stage, the Principal signs the contract for task execution in which he determines the amount and regime of payments to each of the contractors; in the second stage, the contractors choose their own work rates. The optimal amount of payments and the expected completion time of the project are estimated. The characteristics of the optimal contract for each payment regime are numerically simulated. In accordance with the comparative analysis of the simulation results, the project manager (Principal) benefits from choosing the contract with different payments for the contractors and the payment regime upon completion of tasks.",
keywords = "amount of payment, contractor, payment regime, project completion time, project management contract, project manager (Principal), project, task, Stackelberg equilibrium, two-stage game, РИНЦ, SCOPUS",
author = "Zenkevich, {N. A.} and Y. Sokolov and Fattakhova, {M. V.}",
note = "Zenkevich, N. Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Project Management Contract / N. Zenkevich, Y. Sokolov, M. Fattakhova // Automation and Remote Control. - 2020. - Volume 81, Issue 11. - P. 2094-2107. Funding Information: N.A. Zenkevich and M.V. Fattakhova acknowledge the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 16-01-00805_a. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020, Pleiades Publishing, Inc. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2020",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1134/S0005117920110107",
language = "English",
volume = "81",
pages = "2094--2107",
journal = "Automation and Remote Control",
issn = "0005-1179",
publisher = "МАИК {"}Наука/Интерпериодика{"}",
number = "11",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Project Management Contract

AU - Zenkevich, N. A.

AU - Sokolov, Y.

AU - Fattakhova, M. V.

N1 - Zenkevich, N. Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Project Management Contract / N. Zenkevich, Y. Sokolov, M. Fattakhova // Automation and Remote Control. - 2020. - Volume 81, Issue 11. - P. 2094-2107. Funding Information: N.A. Zenkevich and M.V. Fattakhova acknowledge the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 16-01-00805_a. Publisher Copyright: © 2020, Pleiades Publishing, Inc. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2020/11

Y1 - 2020/11

N2 - The paper considers two-stage game-theoretic models of the project management contract with a random duration of tasks. In the first stage, the Principal signs the contract for task execution in which he determines the amount and regime of payments to each of the contractors; in the second stage, the contractors choose their own work rates. The optimal amount of payments and the expected completion time of the project are estimated. The characteristics of the optimal contract for each payment regime are numerically simulated. In accordance with the comparative analysis of the simulation results, the project manager (Principal) benefits from choosing the contract with different payments for the contractors and the payment regime upon completion of tasks.

AB - The paper considers two-stage game-theoretic models of the project management contract with a random duration of tasks. In the first stage, the Principal signs the contract for task execution in which he determines the amount and regime of payments to each of the contractors; in the second stage, the contractors choose their own work rates. The optimal amount of payments and the expected completion time of the project are estimated. The characteristics of the optimal contract for each payment regime are numerically simulated. In accordance with the comparative analysis of the simulation results, the project manager (Principal) benefits from choosing the contract with different payments for the contractors and the payment regime upon completion of tasks.

KW - amount of payment

KW - contractor

KW - payment regime

KW - project completion time

KW - project management contract

KW - project manager (Principal)

KW - project, task

KW - Stackelberg equilibrium

KW - two-stage game

KW - РИНЦ

KW - SCOPUS

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85097578132&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1134/S0005117920110107

DO - 10.1134/S0005117920110107

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85097578132

VL - 81

SP - 2094

EP - 2107

JO - Automation and Remote Control

JF - Automation and Remote Control

SN - 0005-1179

IS - 11

M1 - ISSN 0005-1179

ER -

ID: 75326668