Standard

FISH WARS WITH MANY PLAYERS. / MAZALOV, VLADIMIR V.; RETTIEVA, ANNA N.

в: International Game Theory Review, Том 12, № 04, 2010, стр. 385-405.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

MAZALOV, VLADIMIRV & RETTIEVA, ANNAN 2010, 'FISH WARS WITH MANY PLAYERS', International Game Theory Review, Том. 12, № 04, стр. 385-405. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198910002738

APA

MAZALOV, VLADIMIR. V., & RETTIEVA, ANNA. N. (2010). FISH WARS WITH MANY PLAYERS. International Game Theory Review, 12(04), 385-405. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198910002738

Vancouver

MAZALOV VLADIMIRV, RETTIEVA ANNAN. FISH WARS WITH MANY PLAYERS. International Game Theory Review. 2010;12(04):385-405. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198910002738

Author

MAZALOV, VLADIMIR V. ; RETTIEVA, ANNA N. / FISH WARS WITH MANY PLAYERS. в: International Game Theory Review. 2010 ; Том 12, № 04. стр. 385-405.

BibTeX

@article{54a0293cf2c846b582ec1f0f91d077a8,
title = "FISH WARS WITH MANY PLAYERS",
abstract = "Discrete-time game-theoretic models related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) are investigated. There are some players (countries or fishing firms) which harvest the fish stock. Power population's growth function and logarithmic players' profits are considered. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria. We construct the characteristic function for cooperative game in two unusual forms and determine the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure [Petrosjan (1977)]. We propose the condition which gives an incentive for the players to keep cooperation at each stage and compare it with the {"}irrational-behavior-profness{"} condition [Yeung (2006)]. We propose the linear programming method to find the time-consistent {"}rational{"} solution in C-core. The numerical modelling and the results' comparison were carried out.",
author = "MAZALOV, {VLADIMIR V.} and RETTIEVA, {ANNA N.}",
note = "doi: 10.1142/S0219198910002738",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1142/S0219198910002738",
language = "русский",
volume = "12",
pages = "385--405",
journal = "International Game Theory Review",
issn = "0219-1989",
publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",
number = "04",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - FISH WARS WITH MANY PLAYERS

AU - MAZALOV, VLADIMIR V.

AU - RETTIEVA, ANNA N.

N1 - doi: 10.1142/S0219198910002738

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - Discrete-time game-theoretic models related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) are investigated. There are some players (countries or fishing firms) which harvest the fish stock. Power population's growth function and logarithmic players' profits are considered. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria. We construct the characteristic function for cooperative game in two unusual forms and determine the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure [Petrosjan (1977)]. We propose the condition which gives an incentive for the players to keep cooperation at each stage and compare it with the "irrational-behavior-profness" condition [Yeung (2006)]. We propose the linear programming method to find the time-consistent "rational" solution in C-core. The numerical modelling and the results' comparison were carried out.

AB - Discrete-time game-theoretic models related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) are investigated. There are some players (countries or fishing firms) which harvest the fish stock. Power population's growth function and logarithmic players' profits are considered. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria. We construct the characteristic function for cooperative game in two unusual forms and determine the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure [Petrosjan (1977)]. We propose the condition which gives an incentive for the players to keep cooperation at each stage and compare it with the "irrational-behavior-profness" condition [Yeung (2006)]. We propose the linear programming method to find the time-consistent "rational" solution in C-core. The numerical modelling and the results' comparison were carried out.

U2 - 10.1142/S0219198910002738

DO - 10.1142/S0219198910002738

M3 - статья

VL - 12

SP - 385

EP - 405

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

IS - 04

ER -

ID: 133056026