TY - JOUR

T1 - Fish wars and cooperation maintenance

AU - Mazalov, V.V.

AU - Rettieva, A.N.

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. We divide a fishery into regions, which are exploited by single players. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game. We assume that there are migratory exchanges between the regions of the reservoir. Therefore, the stock in one region depends not only on the previous stock and catch in the region, but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria for an infinite planning horizon. We consider two ways to maintain the cooperation: incentive equilibrium and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We investigate the cooperative incentive equilibrium in the case when the center punishes players for a deviation. Also we consider the case when the center is a player and find the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We introduce a new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperating.

AB - In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. We divide a fishery into regions, which are exploited by single players. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game. We assume that there are migratory exchanges between the regions of the reservoir. Therefore, the stock in one region depends not only on the previous stock and catch in the region, but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria for an infinite planning horizon. We consider two ways to maintain the cooperation: incentive equilibrium and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We investigate the cooperative incentive equilibrium in the case when the center punishes players for a deviation. Also we consider the case when the center is a player and find the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We introduce a new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperating.

KW - Dynamic games

KW - Bioresource management problem

KW - Discrete-time game

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Cooperative equilibrium

KW - Incentive equilibrium

KW - Time-consistency

U2 - 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2010.03.011

DO - 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2010.03.011

M3 - статья

VL - 221

SP - 1545

EP - 1553

JO - Ecological Modelling

JF - Ecological Modelling

SN - 0304-3800

IS - 12

ER -