TY - JOUR

T1 - Evolutionary inspection and corruption games

AU - Katsikas, Stamatios

AU - Kolokoltsov, Vassili

AU - Yang, Wei

PY - 2016/12

Y1 - 2016/12

N2 - We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees’ collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game.

AB - We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees’ collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game.

KW - Corruption game

KW - Dynamic game

KW - Evolutionary game

KW - Inspection budget

KW - Inspection game

KW - Multiple inspectees

KW - Multiple violation levels

KW - Non-cooperative game

KW - Punishment fine

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84993141670&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.3390/g7040031

DO - 10.3390/g7040031

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84993141670

VL - 7

JO - Games

JF - Games

SN - 2073-4336

IS - 4

M1 - 31

ER -