Standard

Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2012. стр. 177-202 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; № 9780817682613).

Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел › научная › Рецензирование

Harvard

Yeung, DWK & Petrosyan, LA 2012, Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. в SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, № 9780817682613, Birkhäuser Verlag AG, стр. 177-202. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_7

APA

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2012). Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. в SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS (стр. 177-202). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; № 9780817682613). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_7

Vancouver

Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA. Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. в SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS. Birkhäuser Verlag AG. 2012. стр. 177-202. (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; 9780817682613). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_7

Author

Yeung, David W.K. ; Petrosyan, Leon A. / Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2012. стр. 177-202 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; 9780817682613).

BibTeX

@inbook{d5d061c41d1842a6a309abca90a23d5b,
title = "Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel",
abstract = "In this chapter, the optimization by cartels that restricts outputs to enhance their joint profit is examined. In particular, we consider oligopolies in which firms agree to form a cartel to restrain output and enhance their profits. Some firms have cost disadvantages that force them to become dormant partners. In Sect. 7.1 a dynamic oligopoly in which there are cost differentials among firms is presented. Pareto optimal output path, imputation schemes, profit sharing arrangements, and time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent solution are derived for a dormant firm cartel in Sect. 7.2. An illustration is shown in the following section. The case when the planning horizon becomes infinite is analyzed in Sect. 7.4, including an illustration with an explicit solution following in the subsequent section.",
keywords = "Consistent solution, Cost advantage, Efficient firm, Extraction cost, Optimal trajectory",
author = "Yeung, {David W.K.} and Petrosyan, {Leon A.}",
year = "2012",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_7",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-0-8176-8261-3",
series = "Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications",
publisher = "Birkh{\"a}user Verlag AG",
number = "9780817682613",
pages = "177--202",
booktitle = "SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS",
address = "Switzerland",

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RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel

AU - Yeung, David W.K.

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

PY - 2012/1/1

Y1 - 2012/1/1

N2 - In this chapter, the optimization by cartels that restricts outputs to enhance their joint profit is examined. In particular, we consider oligopolies in which firms agree to form a cartel to restrain output and enhance their profits. Some firms have cost disadvantages that force them to become dormant partners. In Sect. 7.1 a dynamic oligopoly in which there are cost differentials among firms is presented. Pareto optimal output path, imputation schemes, profit sharing arrangements, and time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent solution are derived for a dormant firm cartel in Sect. 7.2. An illustration is shown in the following section. The case when the planning horizon becomes infinite is analyzed in Sect. 7.4, including an illustration with an explicit solution following in the subsequent section.

AB - In this chapter, the optimization by cartels that restricts outputs to enhance their joint profit is examined. In particular, we consider oligopolies in which firms agree to form a cartel to restrain output and enhance their profits. Some firms have cost disadvantages that force them to become dormant partners. In Sect. 7.1 a dynamic oligopoly in which there are cost differentials among firms is presented. Pareto optimal output path, imputation schemes, profit sharing arrangements, and time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent solution are derived for a dormant firm cartel in Sect. 7.2. An illustration is shown in the following section. The case when the planning horizon becomes infinite is analyzed in Sect. 7.4, including an illustration with an explicit solution following in the subsequent section.

KW - Consistent solution

KW - Cost advantage

KW - Efficient firm

KW - Extraction cost

KW - Optimal trajectory

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SN - 978-0-8176-8261-3

T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications

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EP - 202

BT - SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS

PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG

ER -

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