Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › статья в сборнике материалов конференции › научная › Рецензирование
Dynamic Shapley value for repeated network games with shock. / Gao, Hongwei; Petrosyan, Leon; Sedakov, Artem.
Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. стр. 6449-6455 7161980 (Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015).Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › статья в сборнике материалов конференции › научная › Рецензирование
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TY - GEN
T1 - Dynamic Shapley value for repeated network games with shock
AU - Gao, Hongwei
AU - Petrosyan, Leon
AU - Sedakov, Artem
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2015 IEEE. Copyright: Copyright 2015 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2015/7/17
Y1 - 2015/7/17
N2 - Considering a repeated network formation game, we suppose that the player who has the largest set of neighbors in a network may leave the game with a positive probability. This effect is called a 'shock'. The shock may appear only once, and the game round at which the shock is appeared is chosen at random. Dealing with a cooperative framework of the repeated game, we find the Shapley value, the cooperative solution, in an explicit form. It turns out that the Shapley value is subgame inconsistent for the considered model. The fact of subgame inconsistency may break the cooperative agreement. To prevent players from breaking the agreement, we design a mechanism of stage payments.
AB - Considering a repeated network formation game, we suppose that the player who has the largest set of neighbors in a network may leave the game with a positive probability. This effect is called a 'shock'. The shock may appear only once, and the game round at which the shock is appeared is chosen at random. Dealing with a cooperative framework of the repeated game, we find the Shapley value, the cooperative solution, in an explicit form. It turns out that the Shapley value is subgame inconsistent for the considered model. The fact of subgame inconsistency may break the cooperative agreement. To prevent players from breaking the agreement, we design a mechanism of stage payments.
KW - characteristic function
KW - cooperation
KW - network formation
KW - repeated game
KW - subgame consistency
KW - the Shapley value
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84945582214&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980
DO - 10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015
SP - 6449
EP - 6455
BT - Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015
Y2 - 23 May 2015 through 25 May 2015
ER -
ID: 3940011