Standard

Dynamic Shapley value for repeated network games with shock. / Gao, Hongwei; Petrosyan, Leon; Sedakov, Artem.

Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. стр. 6449-6455 7161980 (Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015).

Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийстатья в сборнике материалов конференциинаучнаяРецензирование

Harvard

Gao, H, Petrosyan, L & Sedakov, A 2015, Dynamic Shapley value for repeated network games with shock. в Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015., 7161980, Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., стр. 6449-6455, 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015, Qingdao, Китай, 23/05/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980, https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980

APA

Gao, H., Petrosyan, L., & Sedakov, A. (2015). Dynamic Shapley value for repeated network games with shock. в Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015 (стр. 6449-6455). [7161980] (Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980, https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980

Vancouver

Gao H, Petrosyan L, Sedakov A. Dynamic Shapley value for repeated network games with shock. в Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2015. стр. 6449-6455. 7161980. (Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015). https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980, https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980

Author

Gao, Hongwei ; Petrosyan, Leon ; Sedakov, Artem. / Dynamic Shapley value for repeated network games with shock. Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. стр. 6449-6455 (Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015).

BibTeX

@inproceedings{78bb714c6fe5481c999c6eb6139ea10e,
title = "Dynamic Shapley value for repeated network games with shock",
abstract = "Considering a repeated network formation game, we suppose that the player who has the largest set of neighbors in a network may leave the game with a positive probability. This effect is called a 'shock'. The shock may appear only once, and the game round at which the shock is appeared is chosen at random. Dealing with a cooperative framework of the repeated game, we find the Shapley value, the cooperative solution, in an explicit form. It turns out that the Shapley value is subgame inconsistent for the considered model. The fact of subgame inconsistency may break the cooperative agreement. To prevent players from breaking the agreement, we design a mechanism of stage payments.",
keywords = "characteristic function, cooperation, network formation, repeated game, subgame consistency, the Shapley value",
author = "Hongwei Gao and Leon Petrosyan and Artem Sedakov",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 IEEE. Copyright: Copyright 2015 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.; 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015 ; Conference date: 23-05-2015 Through 25-05-2015",
year = "2015",
month = jul,
day = "17",
doi = "10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980",
language = "English",
series = "Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
pages = "6449--6455",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015",
address = "United States",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Dynamic Shapley value for repeated network games with shock

AU - Gao, Hongwei

AU - Petrosyan, Leon

AU - Sedakov, Artem

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2015 IEEE. Copyright: Copyright 2015 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2015/7/17

Y1 - 2015/7/17

N2 - Considering a repeated network formation game, we suppose that the player who has the largest set of neighbors in a network may leave the game with a positive probability. This effect is called a 'shock'. The shock may appear only once, and the game round at which the shock is appeared is chosen at random. Dealing with a cooperative framework of the repeated game, we find the Shapley value, the cooperative solution, in an explicit form. It turns out that the Shapley value is subgame inconsistent for the considered model. The fact of subgame inconsistency may break the cooperative agreement. To prevent players from breaking the agreement, we design a mechanism of stage payments.

AB - Considering a repeated network formation game, we suppose that the player who has the largest set of neighbors in a network may leave the game with a positive probability. This effect is called a 'shock'. The shock may appear only once, and the game round at which the shock is appeared is chosen at random. Dealing with a cooperative framework of the repeated game, we find the Shapley value, the cooperative solution, in an explicit form. It turns out that the Shapley value is subgame inconsistent for the considered model. The fact of subgame inconsistency may break the cooperative agreement. To prevent players from breaking the agreement, we design a mechanism of stage payments.

KW - characteristic function

KW - cooperation

KW - network formation

KW - repeated game

KW - subgame consistency

KW - the Shapley value

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84945582214&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980

DO - 10.1109/CCDC.2015.7161980

M3 - Conference contribution

T3 - Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015

SP - 6449

EP - 6455

BT - Proceedings of the 2015 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 27th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2015

Y2 - 23 May 2015 through 25 May 2015

ER -

ID: 3940011