Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел › научная › Рецензирование
Dynamic economic optimization : Group optimality and individual rationality. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.
SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2012. стр. 47-76 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; № 9780817682613).Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел › научная › Рецензирование
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TY - CHAP
T1 - Dynamic economic optimization
T2 - Group optimality and individual rationality
AU - Yeung, David W.K.
AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.
PY - 2012/1/1
Y1 - 2012/1/1
N2 - The most appealing characteristic of perfectly competitive markets is that individually rational behaviors bring about group (Pareto) optimality in economic resource allocation. However, the market fails to provide an effective mechanism for optimal resource use because of the prevalence of imperfect market structure, externalities, imperfect information, and public goods in the current global economy. As a result, though the market is one of the most effective instruments in conducting economic activities, it fails to guarantee its efficiency under the current arrangement. The noncooperative outcomes characterized in Chap. 2 vividly demonstrate that Pareto optimality could not be achieved by markets. Removing market suboptimality is not just a task of achieving a better alternative, but sometimes it can be an absolute necessity. For instance, efforts to alleviate the worldwide financial tsunami and catastrophe-bound industrial pollution are currently pressing issues.
AB - The most appealing characteristic of perfectly competitive markets is that individually rational behaviors bring about group (Pareto) optimality in economic resource allocation. However, the market fails to provide an effective mechanism for optimal resource use because of the prevalence of imperfect market structure, externalities, imperfect information, and public goods in the current global economy. As a result, though the market is one of the most effective instruments in conducting economic activities, it fails to guarantee its efficiency under the current arrangement. The noncooperative outcomes characterized in Chap. 2 vividly demonstrate that Pareto optimality could not be achieved by markets. Removing market suboptimality is not just a task of achieving a better alternative, but sometimes it can be an absolute necessity. For instance, efforts to alleviate the worldwide financial tsunami and catastrophe-bound industrial pollution are currently pressing issues.
KW - Cooperative strategy
KW - Group optimality
KW - Individual rationality
KW - Optimal control problem
KW - Transfer payment
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85057571220&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_3
DO - 10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_3
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85057571220
SN - 978-0-8176-8261-3
T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
SP - 47
EP - 76
BT - SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS
PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG
ER -
ID: 36952622