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Cost-saving joint venture under uncertainty. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2012. стр. 239-270 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаяРецензирование

Harvard

Yeung, DWK & Petrosyan, LA 2012, Cost-saving joint venture under uncertainty. в SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, Birkhäuser Verlag AG, стр. 239-270. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_9

APA

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2012). Cost-saving joint venture under uncertainty. в SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS (стр. 239-270). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_9

Vancouver

Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA. Cost-saving joint venture under uncertainty. в SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS. Birkhäuser Verlag AG. 2012. стр. 239-270. (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_9

Author

Yeung, David W.K. ; Petrosyan, Leon A. / Cost-saving joint venture under uncertainty. SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2012. стр. 239-270 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

BibTeX

@inbook{95067a6873814ba89790a1ce6ca87755,
title = "Cost-saving joint venture under uncertainty",
abstract = "In this chapter, we consider a cost-saving joint venture in the presence of stochastic elements. Section 9.1 formulates a dynamic cost-saving corporate joint venture in a stochastic environment and characterizes its subgame consistent solutions. An explicitly solvable illustration is given in Sect. 9.2. A characterization of the Shapley Value solution to a stochastic cost-saving joint venture is presented in Sect. 9.3 and a payoff distribution procedure leading to a subgame consistent solution is computed. Extensions to infinite-horizon ventures are formulated with explicit illustrations in the subsequent two sections.",
keywords = "Expected profit, Grand coalition, Joint venture, Stochastic control problem, Technical appendix",
author = "Yeung, {David W.K.} and Petrosyan, {Leon A.}",
year = "2012",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_9",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-0-8176-8261-3",
series = "Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications",
publisher = "Birkh{\"a}user Verlag AG",
pages = "239--270",
booktitle = "SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS",
address = "Switzerland",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Cost-saving joint venture under uncertainty

AU - Yeung, David W.K.

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

PY - 2012/1/1

Y1 - 2012/1/1

N2 - In this chapter, we consider a cost-saving joint venture in the presence of stochastic elements. Section 9.1 formulates a dynamic cost-saving corporate joint venture in a stochastic environment and characterizes its subgame consistent solutions. An explicitly solvable illustration is given in Sect. 9.2. A characterization of the Shapley Value solution to a stochastic cost-saving joint venture is presented in Sect. 9.3 and a payoff distribution procedure leading to a subgame consistent solution is computed. Extensions to infinite-horizon ventures are formulated with explicit illustrations in the subsequent two sections.

AB - In this chapter, we consider a cost-saving joint venture in the presence of stochastic elements. Section 9.1 formulates a dynamic cost-saving corporate joint venture in a stochastic environment and characterizes its subgame consistent solutions. An explicitly solvable illustration is given in Sect. 9.2. A characterization of the Shapley Value solution to a stochastic cost-saving joint venture is presented in Sect. 9.3 and a payoff distribution procedure leading to a subgame consistent solution is computed. Extensions to infinite-horizon ventures are formulated with explicit illustrations in the subsequent two sections.

KW - Expected profit

KW - Grand coalition

KW - Joint venture

KW - Stochastic control problem

KW - Technical appendix

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85057520545&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_9

DO - 10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_9

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85057520545

SN - 978-0-8176-8261-3

T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications

SP - 239

EP - 270

BT - SUBGAME CONSISTENT ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION: AN ADVANCED COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS

PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG

ER -

ID: 36951612