TY - JOUR

T1 - Coordinating contracts as an instrument of supply chain profit maximization under short-term financing necessity

AU - Berezinets, Irina

AU - Voronova, Tatyana

AU - Zenkevich , Nikolay

AU - Nikolchenko, Natalia Nikolchenko

N1 - Berezinets, I. Coordinating contracts as an instrument of supply chain profit maximization under short-term financing necessity / I. Berezinets, T. Voronova, N. Zenkevich, N. Nikolchenko // Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2020. - Volume 13. - P. 57–94.

PY - 2020/11/3

Y1 - 2020/11/3

N2 - In this paper the problem of the supply chain expected profit maximization under the assumption of the short-term financing necessity for one of the supply chain parties using a coordinating contract is considered. The solution is derived for a two-echelon supply chain under the assumption of product demand being distributed as uniformly. A revenue-sharing contract with bank financing and a modified revenue-sharing contract with trade credit financing are explored. It is stated that none of the studied contracts is coordinating, as they do not provide the supplier’s expected profit maximum. The conditional coordination of supply chain with a modified revenue-sharing contract with trade credit financing is considered if the supply chain and the retailer’s expected profit maximum are reached and the supplier’s expected profit is greater than in case of application of a modified wholesale price contract with trade credit financing and a revenue-sharing contract with bank financing. It is proved that it is beneficial for both supply chain parties and the problem of the supply chain expected profit maximization under the assumption of the short-term financing necessity for one of the supply chain parties can be solved using a modified revenue-sharing contract with trade credit financing.

AB - In this paper the problem of the supply chain expected profit maximization under the assumption of the short-term financing necessity for one of the supply chain parties using a coordinating contract is considered. The solution is derived for a two-echelon supply chain under the assumption of product demand being distributed as uniformly. A revenue-sharing contract with bank financing and a modified revenue-sharing contract with trade credit financing are explored. It is stated that none of the studied contracts is coordinating, as they do not provide the supplier’s expected profit maximum. The conditional coordination of supply chain with a modified revenue-sharing contract with trade credit financing is considered if the supply chain and the retailer’s expected profit maximum are reached and the supplier’s expected profit is greater than in case of application of a modified wholesale price contract with trade credit financing and a revenue-sharing contract with bank financing. It is proved that it is beneficial for both supply chain parties and the problem of the supply chain expected profit maximization under the assumption of the short-term financing necessity for one of the supply chain parties can be solved using a modified revenue-sharing contract with trade credit financing.

KW - supply chain

KW - COORDINATION

KW - COORDINATING CONTRACT

KW - PROFIT

KW - SHORT-TERM FINANCING

UR - https://dspace.spbu.ru/handle/11701/20691

UR - https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=43973983

M3 - Article

VL - 13

SP - 57

EP - 94

JO - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

JF - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

SN - 2310-2608

ER -