TY - CHAP

T1 - Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

AU - Zaccour, Georges

PY - 2018/8/12

Y1 - 2018/8/12

N2 - In many instances, players find it individually and collectively rational to sign a long-term cooperative agreement. A major concern in such a setting is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition is satisfied for all players, then we say that the agreement is time consistent. This chapter deals with the design of schemes that guarantee time consistency in deterministic differential games with transferable payoffs.

AB - In many instances, players find it individually and collectively rational to sign a long-term cooperative agreement. A major concern in such a setting is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition is satisfied for all players, then we say that the agreement is time consistent. This chapter deals with the design of schemes that guarantee time consistency in deterministic differential games with transferable payoffs.

KW - Cooperative differential games

KW - Core

KW - Imputation distribution procedure

KW - Shapley value

KW - Strong time consistency

KW - Time consistency

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85063059269&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85063059269

SN - 9783319443737

SP - 595

EP - 632

BT - Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory

PB - Springer Nature

ER -