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Asymmetric Dynamic Resource Management Problem with Different Regimes. / Mazalov, V. V.; Rettieva, A. N.

в: Doklady Mathematics, Том 112, № 1, 2025, стр. S119-S126.

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Mazalov, V. V. ; Rettieva, A. N. / Asymmetric Dynamic Resource Management Problem with Different Regimes. в: Doklady Mathematics. 2025 ; Том 112, № 1. стр. S119-S126.

BibTeX

@article{3d746fe3eed04ea49f0b7d28f3349c7c,
title = "Asymmetric Dynamic Resource Management Problem with Different Regimes",
abstract = "A dynamic game related to a resource management problem with asymmetric players is considered. The resource evolution depends on interchanged usage regimes: exploitation periods, where many players extract a common resource, and moratorium periods, where extraction is prohibited and the resource stock evolves according to the natural growth rule. Both noncooperative and cooperative behaviors of players are constructed and compared. To maintain sustainable resource exploitation, a certain ratio of the lengths of moratorium to extraction periods is applied. The value of exploitation horizon is determined by optimizing the price of anarchy.",
author = "Mazalov, {V. V.} and Rettieva, {A. N.}",
year = "2025",
doi = "10.1134/S1064562425601003",
language = "English",
volume = "112",
pages = "S119--S126",
journal = "Doklady Mathematics",
issn = "1064-5624",
publisher = "МАИК {"}Наука/Интерпериодика{"}",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Asymmetric Dynamic Resource Management Problem with Different Regimes

AU - Mazalov, V. V.

AU - Rettieva, A. N.

PY - 2025

Y1 - 2025

N2 - A dynamic game related to a resource management problem with asymmetric players is considered. The resource evolution depends on interchanged usage regimes: exploitation periods, where many players extract a common resource, and moratorium periods, where extraction is prohibited and the resource stock evolves according to the natural growth rule. Both noncooperative and cooperative behaviors of players are constructed and compared. To maintain sustainable resource exploitation, a certain ratio of the lengths of moratorium to extraction periods is applied. The value of exploitation horizon is determined by optimizing the price of anarchy.

AB - A dynamic game related to a resource management problem with asymmetric players is considered. The resource evolution depends on interchanged usage regimes: exploitation periods, where many players extract a common resource, and moratorium periods, where extraction is prohibited and the resource stock evolves according to the natural growth rule. Both noncooperative and cooperative behaviors of players are constructed and compared. To maintain sustainable resource exploitation, a certain ratio of the lengths of moratorium to extraction periods is applied. The value of exploitation horizon is determined by optimizing the price of anarchy.

U2 - 10.1134/S1064562425601003

DO - 10.1134/S1064562425601003

M3 - Article

VL - 112

SP - S119-S126

JO - Doklady Mathematics

JF - Doklady Mathematics

SN - 1064-5624

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 152316725