Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
A substitute for the classical neumann-morgenstern characteristic function in cooperative differential games. / Gromova, Ekaterina; Marova, Ekaterina; Gromov, Dmitry.
в: Journal of Dynamics and Games, Том 7, № 2, 01.04.2020, стр. 105-122.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
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TY - JOUR
T1 - A substitute for the classical neumann-morgenstern characteristic function in cooperative differential games
AU - Gromova, Ekaterina
AU - Marova, Ekaterina
AU - Gromov, Dmitry
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020, American Institute of Mathematical Sciences.
PY - 2020/4/1
Y1 - 2020/4/1
N2 - In this paper, we present a systematic overview of diffierent endogenous optimization-based characteristic functions and discuss their properties. Furthermore, we define and analyze in detail a new, n-characteristic function. This characteristic function has a substantial advantage over other characteristic functions in that it can be obtained with a minimal computational effiort and has a reasonable economic interpretation. In particular, the new characteristic function can be seen as a reduced version of the classical Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function, where the players both from the coalition and from the complementary coalition use their previously computed strategies instead of solving respective optimization problems. Our finding are illustrated by a pollution control game with n non-identical players. For the considered game, we compute all characteristic functions and compare their properties. Quite surprisingly, it turns out that both the characteristic functions and the resulting cooperative solutions satisfy some symmetry relations.
AB - In this paper, we present a systematic overview of diffierent endogenous optimization-based characteristic functions and discuss their properties. Furthermore, we define and analyze in detail a new, n-characteristic function. This characteristic function has a substantial advantage over other characteristic functions in that it can be obtained with a minimal computational effiort and has a reasonable economic interpretation. In particular, the new characteristic function can be seen as a reduced version of the classical Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function, where the players both from the coalition and from the complementary coalition use their previously computed strategies instead of solving respective optimization problems. Our finding are illustrated by a pollution control game with n non-identical players. For the considered game, we compute all characteristic functions and compare their properties. Quite surprisingly, it turns out that both the characteristic functions and the resulting cooperative solutions satisfy some symmetry relations.
KW - Characteristic function
KW - Cooperative games
KW - Diffierential games
KW - Pollution control
KW - COALITION
KW - pollution control
KW - differential games
KW - ALLOCATION
KW - characteristic function
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85086171622&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3934/jdg.2020007
DO - 10.3934/jdg.2020007
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85086171622
VL - 7
SP - 105
EP - 122
JO - Journal of Dynamics and Games
JF - Journal of Dynamics and Games
SN - 2164-6066
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 53985967