TY - GEN

T1 - A Multistage Bicriteria Production Game with Pollution Control

AU - Kuzyutin, D.

AU - Smirnova, N.

N1 - Export Date: 10 November 2024

PY - 2024

Y1 - 2024

N2 - In the chapter, we introduce and examine a finite-horizon bicriteria oligopoly game with pollution control, which takes into account both the economic objective of each player and the players’ concern of cleaner environment at each stage of the game. Noncooperative (viz., subgame-perfect Pareto equilibrium) and cooperative solutions are derived in explicit form for two-person game with symmetric players using the dynamic programming method. Some properties of these solutions are established. We provide a numerical example to demonstrate the theoretical results and to compare single-criterion and bicriteria model as well as noncooperative and cooperative solutions. It turns out that a cooperative regime is better for the environment (i.e., implies lower level of the pollution stock) than a competitive behavior both in the bicriteria model and its single-criterion counterpart. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.

AB - In the chapter, we introduce and examine a finite-horizon bicriteria oligopoly game with pollution control, which takes into account both the economic objective of each player and the players’ concern of cleaner environment at each stage of the game. Noncooperative (viz., subgame-perfect Pareto equilibrium) and cooperative solutions are derived in explicit form for two-person game with symmetric players using the dynamic programming method. Some properties of these solutions are established. We provide a numerical example to demonstrate the theoretical results and to compare single-criterion and bicriteria model as well as noncooperative and cooperative solutions. It turns out that a cooperative regime is better for the environment (i.e., implies lower level of the pollution stock) than a competitive behavior both in the bicriteria model and its single-criterion counterpart. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/54f3bcb2-717f-362a-8f83-c200cb46f926/

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-66379-6_7

DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-66379-6_7

M3 - статья в сборнике материалов конференции

T3 - Trends in Mathematics

SP - 93

EP - 107

BT - Frontiers of Dynamic Games (GTA 2022)

PB - Springer Nature

Y2 - 28 June 2022 through 1 July 2022

ER -