TY - JOUR

T1 - A Dynamic Network Game of the Fintech Industry

AU - Yeung, David W. K.

AU - Петросян, Леон Аганесович

AU - Zhang, Yingxuan

N1 - Export Date: 04 March 2024; Cited By: 0

PY - 2024/3/1

Y1 - 2024/3/1

N2 - Economies of scale, economies of scope, and technology spillover are decisive economic elements that are crucial to the development in the Fintech industry. These positive externalities are often realized through network links. In this paper, we present a dynamic network of financial firms which exhibits these decisive elements. The network game equilibria are characterized. A Pareto efficient solution involving collaboration of all firms is provided. To obtain a fair-share distribution of cooperative gains, the Shapley value is adopted as the sharing mechanism. Payoff distribution mechanisms which guarantee the fulfilment of the Shapley value distribution in each stage of the cooperation duration are derived. © Operations Research Society of China, Periodicals Agency of Shanghai University, Science Press, and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2023. Springer Nature or its licensor holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

AB - Economies of scale, economies of scope, and technology spillover are decisive economic elements that are crucial to the development in the Fintech industry. These positive externalities are often realized through network links. In this paper, we present a dynamic network of financial firms which exhibits these decisive elements. The network game equilibria are characterized. A Pareto efficient solution involving collaboration of all firms is provided. To obtain a fair-share distribution of cooperative gains, the Shapley value is adopted as the sharing mechanism. Payoff distribution mechanisms which guarantee the fulfilment of the Shapley value distribution in each stage of the cooperation duration are derived. © Operations Research Society of China, Periodicals Agency of Shanghai University, Science Press, and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2023. Springer Nature or its licensor holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

KW - 90B10

KW - 91-08

KW - 91A25

KW - 91B06

KW - Network equilibria

KW - Network game

KW - Pareto efficient cooperation

KW - Shapley value

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/46ba4ea5-fd7f-322f-a25c-867b9d9d1479/

U2 - 10.1007/s40305-022-00434-4

DO - 10.1007/s40305-022-00434-4

M3 - статья

VL - 12

SP - 5

EP - 33

JO - Journal of the Operations Research Society of China

JF - Journal of the Operations Research Society of China

SN - 2194-668X

IS - 1

ER -