The article examines the process of the appearance of the concept of “Yellow Russia” in the lexicon of Russian public figures and publicists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The author analyzes the geopolitical views of a number of well-known Russian military leaders who proposed the use of various forms of control over the territory of Northern Manchuria, owned at the time by China, and had provided plans for the development of the territory of the Russian Far East. Using documents deposited in the fund of the General Chancellery of the Minister of Finance of the Russian State Historical Archive, the author shows a wide range of opinions among the country’s top military leaders on plans in the Far East. Despite differences in approaches and assessments of the situation in “Yellow Russia,” most representatives of Russia's military elite were firmly convinced that Russia could not give up domination over Manchuria. The author concludes that there was no clear understanding of what the Russian Far East should represent in the future, among both tsarist administrators of high rank, and high-ranking military figures. The disunity of the ministries and departments meant that officials in the capital rarely delved deep into the essence of problems of this region. The weakening of militaristic rhetoric occurred already during the First World War, which was unfolding unsuccessfully for Russia.