Кооперативные двухшаговые сетевые игры с направленными связями и положительным или отрицательным влиянием игроков

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Кооперативные двухшаговые сетевые игры с направленными связями и положительным или отрицательным влиянием игроков. / Suna, Ping; Parilina, Elena M.; Gaob, Hongwei.

в: Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Prikladnaya Matematika, Informatika, Protsessy Upravleniya, Том 18, № 1, 2022, стр. 87-98.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

BibTeX

@article{3e4554751cab4d76b58f415d6cb22bab,

title = "Кооперативные двухшаговые сетевые игры с направленными связями и положительным или отрицательным влиянием игроков",

abstract = "Inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, we introduce a model of two-stage network games, when players first form a directed network (the first stage) and then they may reconsider the actions made at the first stage and choose controls to influence other players in a positive or negative way (the second stage). At both stages players get their payoffs. Considering a cooperative version of the game, we examine the problem of subgame network consistency and design an imputation distribution procedure as a new system of stage payments to guarantee the long-term cooperation. The Shapley value with exogenous directed graph constraint is used as a cooperative solution concept. Finally, we prove that a cooperative subgame is convex which ensures the non-emptiness of the core.",

keywords = "convex game, directed graph, imputation distribution procedure, network games, subgame consistency, the Shapley value",

author = "Ping Suna and Parilina, {Elena M.} and Hongwei Gaob",

note = "Funding Information: ∗ The work of E. M. Parilina is supported by Russian Science Foundation (project N 17-11-01079). {\textcopyright}c St Petersburg State University, 2022 Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 Saint Petersburg State University. All rights reserved.",

year = "2022",

doi = "10.21638/11701/SPBU10.2022.107",

language = "русский",

volume = "18",

pages = "87--98",

journal = " ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА. ИНФОРМАТИКА. ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ",

issn = "1811-9905",

publisher = "Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета",

number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Кооперативные двухшаговые сетевые игры с направленными связями и положительным или отрицательным влиянием игроков

AU - Suna, Ping

AU - Parilina, Elena M.

AU - Gaob, Hongwei

N1 - Funding Information: ∗ The work of E. M. Parilina is supported by Russian Science Foundation (project N 17-11-01079). ©c St Petersburg State University, 2022 Publisher Copyright: © 2022 Saint Petersburg State University. All rights reserved.

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - Inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, we introduce a model of two-stage network games, when players first form a directed network (the first stage) and then they may reconsider the actions made at the first stage and choose controls to influence other players in a positive or negative way (the second stage). At both stages players get their payoffs. Considering a cooperative version of the game, we examine the problem of subgame network consistency and design an imputation distribution procedure as a new system of stage payments to guarantee the long-term cooperation. The Shapley value with exogenous directed graph constraint is used as a cooperative solution concept. Finally, we prove that a cooperative subgame is convex which ensures the non-emptiness of the core.

AB - Inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, we introduce a model of two-stage network games, when players first form a directed network (the first stage) and then they may reconsider the actions made at the first stage and choose controls to influence other players in a positive or negative way (the second stage). At both stages players get their payoffs. Considering a cooperative version of the game, we examine the problem of subgame network consistency and design an imputation distribution procedure as a new system of stage payments to guarantee the long-term cooperation. The Shapley value with exogenous directed graph constraint is used as a cooperative solution concept. Finally, we prove that a cooperative subgame is convex which ensures the non-emptiness of the core.

KW - convex game

KW - directed graph

KW - imputation distribution procedure

KW - network games

KW - subgame consistency

KW - the Shapley value

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85134164227&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/64153b47-cfb6-3916-87b2-6bccd50736b1/

U2 - 10.21638/11701/SPBU10.2022.107

DO - 10.21638/11701/SPBU10.2022.107

M3 - статья

AN - SCOPUS:85134164227

VL - 18

SP - 87

EP - 98

JO - ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА. ИНФОРМАТИКА. ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ

JF - ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА. ИНФОРМАТИКА. ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ

SN - 1811-9905

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 97291675