Standard

Why Protagoras gets paid anyway: a practical solution of the Paradox of court. / Lisanyuk, Elena.

In: SCHOLE. ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ АНТИКОВЕДЕНИЕ И КЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2017, p. 61-77.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Lisanyuk, E 2017, 'Why Protagoras gets paid anyway: a practical solution of the Paradox of court', SCHOLE. ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ АНТИКОВЕДЕНИЕ И КЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 61-77. https://doi.org/10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.4519

APA

Lisanyuk, E. (2017). Why Protagoras gets paid anyway: a practical solution of the Paradox of court. SCHOLE. ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ АНТИКОВЕДЕНИЕ И КЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ, 11(1), 61-77. https://doi.org/10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.4519

Vancouver

Lisanyuk E. Why Protagoras gets paid anyway: a practical solution of the Paradox of court. SCHOLE. ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ АНТИКОВЕДЕНИЕ И КЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ. 2017;11(1):61-77. https://doi.org/10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.4519

Author

Lisanyuk, Elena. / Why Protagoras gets paid anyway: a practical solution of the Paradox of court. In: SCHOLE. ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ АНТИКОВЕДЕНИЕ И КЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ. 2017 ; Vol. 11, No. 1. pp. 61-77.

BibTeX

@article{844f1086f14c41ebb2e5b9f53efcfbcf,
title = "Why Protagoras gets paid anyway: a practical solution of the Paradox of court",
abstract = "The famous dispute between Protagoras and Euathlus concerning Protagoras{\textquoteright}s tuition fee reportedly owed to him by Euathlus is solved on the basis of practical argumentation concerning actions. The dispute is widely viewed as a kind of a logical paradox, and I show that such treating arises due to the double confusion in the dispute narrative. The linguistic expressions used to refer to Protagoras{\textquoteright}s, Euathlus{\textquoteright}s and the jurors{\textquoteright} actions are confused with these actions themselves. The other confusion is the collision between the pairs of incompatible actions ambiguously expressed by two different pairs of sentences, one of which is a propositionally consistent pair whereas the other is an inconsistent one. The actional (practical) paradox solution aims to clear up these confusions by means of two core borderlines, propositional and expressive, drawn between the actions and the propositions. The propositional distinction says that actions are empirical facts and they lack truth values unlike propositions, which are",
keywords = "Protagoras, logical paradox, argumentation, agency, action, sophism, consistency",
author = "Elena Lisanyuk",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.4519",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "61--77",
journal = "SCHOLE. ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ АНТИКОВЕДЕНИЕ И КЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ",
issn = "1995-4328",
publisher = "Издательство Новосибирского университета",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Why Protagoras gets paid anyway: a practical solution of the Paradox of court

AU - Lisanyuk, Elena

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - The famous dispute between Protagoras and Euathlus concerning Protagoras’s tuition fee reportedly owed to him by Euathlus is solved on the basis of practical argumentation concerning actions. The dispute is widely viewed as a kind of a logical paradox, and I show that such treating arises due to the double confusion in the dispute narrative. The linguistic expressions used to refer to Protagoras’s, Euathlus’s and the jurors’ actions are confused with these actions themselves. The other confusion is the collision between the pairs of incompatible actions ambiguously expressed by two different pairs of sentences, one of which is a propositionally consistent pair whereas the other is an inconsistent one. The actional (practical) paradox solution aims to clear up these confusions by means of two core borderlines, propositional and expressive, drawn between the actions and the propositions. The propositional distinction says that actions are empirical facts and they lack truth values unlike propositions, which are

AB - The famous dispute between Protagoras and Euathlus concerning Protagoras’s tuition fee reportedly owed to him by Euathlus is solved on the basis of practical argumentation concerning actions. The dispute is widely viewed as a kind of a logical paradox, and I show that such treating arises due to the double confusion in the dispute narrative. The linguistic expressions used to refer to Protagoras’s, Euathlus’s and the jurors’ actions are confused with these actions themselves. The other confusion is the collision between the pairs of incompatible actions ambiguously expressed by two different pairs of sentences, one of which is a propositionally consistent pair whereas the other is an inconsistent one. The actional (practical) paradox solution aims to clear up these confusions by means of two core borderlines, propositional and expressive, drawn between the actions and the propositions. The propositional distinction says that actions are empirical facts and they lack truth values unlike propositions, which are

KW - Protagoras

KW - logical paradox

KW - argumentation

KW - agency

KW - action

KW - sophism

KW - consistency

UR - https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=29127758

U2 - 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.4519

DO - 10.21267/AQUILO.2017.11.4519

M3 - Article

VL - 11

SP - 61

EP - 77

JO - SCHOLE. ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ АНТИКОВЕДЕНИЕ И КЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ

JF - SCHOLE. ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ АНТИКОВЕДЕНИЕ И КЛАССИЧЕСКАЯ ТРАДИЦИЯ

SN - 1995-4328

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 7734949