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Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function. / Lien, Jaimie W.; Mazalov, Vladimir V.; Melnik, Anna V.; Zheng, Jie.

2016. 37-49 Paper presented at Дискретная оптимизация и исследование операций, Владивосток, Russian Federation.

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

Harvard

Lien, JW, Mazalov, VV, Melnik, AV & Zheng, J 2016, 'Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function', Paper presented at Дискретная оптимизация и исследование операций, Владивосток, Russian Federation, 19/09/16 - 23/09/16 pp. 37-49. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44914-2_4

APA

Lien, J. W., Mazalov, V. V., Melnik, A. V., & Zheng, J. (2016). Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function. 37-49. Paper presented at Дискретная оптимизация и исследование операций, Владивосток, Russian Federation. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44914-2_4

Vancouver

Lien JW, Mazalov VV, Melnik AV, Zheng J. Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function. 2016. Paper presented at Дискретная оптимизация и исследование операций, Владивосток, Russian Federation. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44914-2_4

Author

Lien, Jaimie W. ; Mazalov, Vladimir V. ; Melnik, Anna V. ; Zheng, Jie. / Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function. Paper presented at Дискретная оптимизация и исследование операций, Владивосток, Russian Federation.13 p.

BibTeX

@conference{90b418a43a294761930895c69bcd815e,
title = "Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function",
abstract = "This paper considers a network comprised of parallel routes with the Bureau of Public Road (BPR) latency function and suggests an optimal distribution method for incoming traffic flow. The authors analytically derive a system of equations defining the optimal distribution of the incoming flow with minimum social costs, as well as a corresponding system of equations for the Wardrop equilibrium in this network. In particular, the Wardrop equilibrium is applied to the competition model with rational consumers who use the carriers with minimal cost, where cost is equal to the price for service plus the waiting time for the service. Finally, the social costs under the equilibrium and under the optimal distribution are compared. It is shown that the price of anarchy can be infinitely large in the model with strategic pricing.",
author = "Lien, {Jaimie W.} and Mazalov, {Vladimir V.} and Melnik, {Anna V.} and Jie Zheng",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-44914-2_4",
language = "English",
pages = "37--49",
note = "null ; Conference date: 19-09-2016 Through 23-09-2016",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function

AU - Lien, Jaimie W.

AU - Mazalov, Vladimir V.

AU - Melnik, Anna V.

AU - Zheng, Jie

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - This paper considers a network comprised of parallel routes with the Bureau of Public Road (BPR) latency function and suggests an optimal distribution method for incoming traffic flow. The authors analytically derive a system of equations defining the optimal distribution of the incoming flow with minimum social costs, as well as a corresponding system of equations for the Wardrop equilibrium in this network. In particular, the Wardrop equilibrium is applied to the competition model with rational consumers who use the carriers with minimal cost, where cost is equal to the price for service plus the waiting time for the service. Finally, the social costs under the equilibrium and under the optimal distribution are compared. It is shown that the price of anarchy can be infinitely large in the model with strategic pricing.

AB - This paper considers a network comprised of parallel routes with the Bureau of Public Road (BPR) latency function and suggests an optimal distribution method for incoming traffic flow. The authors analytically derive a system of equations defining the optimal distribution of the incoming flow with minimum social costs, as well as a corresponding system of equations for the Wardrop equilibrium in this network. In particular, the Wardrop equilibrium is applied to the competition model with rational consumers who use the carriers with minimal cost, where cost is equal to the price for service plus the waiting time for the service. Finally, the social costs under the equilibrium and under the optimal distribution are compared. It is shown that the price of anarchy can be infinitely large in the model with strategic pricing.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-44914-2_4

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-44914-2_4

M3 - Paper

SP - 37

EP - 49

Y2 - 19 September 2016 through 23 September 2016

ER -

ID: 133691351