Standard

Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure. / Béal, Sylvain; Khmelnitskaya, Anna; Solal, Philippe.

In: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Vol. 35, No. 2, 01.01.2018, p. 563-587.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Béal, S, Khmelnitskaya, A & Solal, P 2018, 'Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure', Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 563-587. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0194-1

APA

Béal, S., Khmelnitskaya, A., & Solal, P. (2018). Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 35(2), 563-587. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0194-1

Vancouver

Béal S, Khmelnitskaya A, Solal P. Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018 Jan 1;35(2):563-587. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0194-1

Author

Béal, Sylvain ; Khmelnitskaya, Anna ; Solal, Philippe. / Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure. In: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018 ; Vol. 35, No. 2. pp. 563-587.

BibTeX

@article{7ecc656534374bb698ffdfa7eba53f55,
title = "Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure",
abstract = "TU games with two-level communication structure, in which a two-level communication structure relates fundamentally to the given coalition structure and consists of a communication graph on the collection of the a priori unions in the coalition structure, as well as a collection of communication graphs within each union, are considered. For such games we introduce two families of two-step values inspired by the two-step procedures staying behind the Owen value (Owen, in: Henn, Moeschlin (eds) Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, pp 76–88, 1977) and the two-step Shapley value (Kamijo in Int Game Theory Rev 11:207–214, 2009) for games with coalition structure. Our approach is based on the unified treatment of several component efficient values for games with communication structure and it generates two-stage solution concepts that apply component efficient values for games with communication structure on both distribution levels. Comparable axiomatic characterizations are provided.",
keywords = "Component efficiency, Deletion link property, Owen value, TU game with two-level communication structure, Two-step Shapley value",
author = "Sylvain B{\'e}al and Anna Khmelnitskaya and Philippe Solal",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s10878-017-0194-1",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "563--587",
journal = "Journal of Combinatorial Optimization",
issn = "1382-6905",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure

AU - Béal, Sylvain

AU - Khmelnitskaya, Anna

AU - Solal, Philippe

PY - 2018/1/1

Y1 - 2018/1/1

N2 - TU games with two-level communication structure, in which a two-level communication structure relates fundamentally to the given coalition structure and consists of a communication graph on the collection of the a priori unions in the coalition structure, as well as a collection of communication graphs within each union, are considered. For such games we introduce two families of two-step values inspired by the two-step procedures staying behind the Owen value (Owen, in: Henn, Moeschlin (eds) Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, pp 76–88, 1977) and the two-step Shapley value (Kamijo in Int Game Theory Rev 11:207–214, 2009) for games with coalition structure. Our approach is based on the unified treatment of several component efficient values for games with communication structure and it generates two-stage solution concepts that apply component efficient values for games with communication structure on both distribution levels. Comparable axiomatic characterizations are provided.

AB - TU games with two-level communication structure, in which a two-level communication structure relates fundamentally to the given coalition structure and consists of a communication graph on the collection of the a priori unions in the coalition structure, as well as a collection of communication graphs within each union, are considered. For such games we introduce two families of two-step values inspired by the two-step procedures staying behind the Owen value (Owen, in: Henn, Moeschlin (eds) Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, pp 76–88, 1977) and the two-step Shapley value (Kamijo in Int Game Theory Rev 11:207–214, 2009) for games with coalition structure. Our approach is based on the unified treatment of several component efficient values for games with communication structure and it generates two-stage solution concepts that apply component efficient values for games with communication structure on both distribution levels. Comparable axiomatic characterizations are provided.

KW - Component efficiency

KW - Deletion link property

KW - Owen value

KW - TU game with two-level communication structure

KW - Two-step Shapley value

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85047545829&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10878-017-0194-1

DO - 10.1007/s10878-017-0194-1

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85047545829

VL - 35

SP - 563

EP - 587

JO - Journal of Combinatorial Optimization

JF - Journal of Combinatorial Optimization

SN - 1382-6905

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 41479028