TY - CONF

T1 - Two-Stage Game Model of Opinion Dynamics

AU - Liu, Yanshan

AU - V. Mazalov, Vladimir

AU - Gao, Hongwei

PY - 2025

Y1 - 2025

N2 - This paper presents a two-stage opinion dynamics game model to investigate how two players influence an agent’s opinion within a Stackelberg game framework. Optimal control strategies are obtained via the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. In the first stage, player 1, acting as the leader, exerts significant influence on the agent’s initial opinion trajectory through optimal control. In the second stage, player 2, as the follower, can partially guide the opinion, but the agent’s final opinion remains closer to player 1’s target due to the first-mover advantage. Theoretical results are supported by numerical simulations, highlighting the phased nature of the opinion trajectory and its dynamic relation to the players’ targets.

AB - This paper presents a two-stage opinion dynamics game model to investigate how two players influence an agent’s opinion within a Stackelberg game framework. Optimal control strategies are obtained via the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. In the first stage, player 1, acting as the leader, exerts significant influence on the agent’s initial opinion trajectory through optimal control. In the second stage, player 2, as the follower, can partially guide the opinion, but the agent’s final opinion remains closer to player 1’s target due to the first-mover advantage. Theoretical results are supported by numerical simulations, highlighting the phased nature of the opinion trajectory and its dynamic relation to the players’ targets.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-97077-1_14

DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-97077-1_14

M3 - материалы

SP - 195

EP - 207

T2 - XXIV International conference Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research MOTOR 2025

Y2 - 7 July 2025 through 11 July 2025

ER -