The problem of allocating a value in hierarchical cooperative structures is important in the game theoretic literature, and it often arises in practice. In this paper, we consider a two-level structure of players communication and propose a procedure allocating the value in two steps: first the value is allocated at the upper level among groups of players, and then each group allocates the designated value among its members. We demonstrate how to allocate the value in two steps using the Shapley value and show the difference with the classical one-step allocation procedure. We then adopt this approach for games with pairwise interactions and provide relations between several definitions of the characteristic function and the corresponding Shapley values.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)71-81
Number of pages11
JournalLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume277
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2019

    Research areas

  • Cooperation, Hierarchy, Network, Shapley value, Two-level allocation

    Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications

ID: 41129681