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To Eavesdrop or Jam, That is the Question. / Garnaev, A.; Trappe, W.

In: Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, Vol. 129, 2014, p. 146-161.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Harvard

Garnaev, A & Trappe, W 2014, 'To Eavesdrop or Jam, That is the Question', Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 129, pp. 146-161. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04105-6_10

APA

Garnaev, A., & Trappe, W. (2014). To Eavesdrop or Jam, That is the Question. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 129, 146-161. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04105-6_10

Vancouver

Garnaev A, Trappe W. To Eavesdrop or Jam, That is the Question. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. 2014;129:146-161. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04105-6_10

Author

Garnaev, A. ; Trappe, W. / To Eavesdrop or Jam, That is the Question. In: Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. 2014 ; Vol. 129. pp. 146-161.

BibTeX

@article{8a21fe8e37fc48be80eef550481e997e,
title = "To Eavesdrop or Jam, That is the Question",
abstract = "Physical layer secret communication is evaluated by the secrecy rate/capacity, which loosely is the Alice-Bob communication rate minus the Alice-Eve communication rate. Eve{\textquoteright}s objective is to reduce the secrecy rate and typically this is accomplished by eavesdropping, but it also can be accomplished by Eve directing interference at Bob, reducing the Alice-Bob channel rate. We examine secret communication from Eve{\textquoteright}s perspective, where she can either eavesdrop or jam, but not both simultaneously. There are costs and advantages associated with these two options, and to explore the selection between these two options, we apply a game-theoretical approach. We find the equilibrium strategies for two scenarios: (a) Alice and Eve have to decide the probability for which each can apply On/Off power strategies in choosing between eavesdropping and jamming options, (b) Alice and Eve tune transmission/jamming powers and Eve chooses either a single-level or bi-level mode for interfering with the Alice-Bob communication. We",
author = "A. Garnaev and W. Trappe",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-04105-6_10",
language = "English",
volume = "129",
pages = "146--161",
journal = "Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST",
issn = "1867-8211",
publisher = "Springer Nature",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - To Eavesdrop or Jam, That is the Question

AU - Garnaev, A.

AU - Trappe, W.

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Physical layer secret communication is evaluated by the secrecy rate/capacity, which loosely is the Alice-Bob communication rate minus the Alice-Eve communication rate. Eve’s objective is to reduce the secrecy rate and typically this is accomplished by eavesdropping, but it also can be accomplished by Eve directing interference at Bob, reducing the Alice-Bob channel rate. We examine secret communication from Eve’s perspective, where she can either eavesdrop or jam, but not both simultaneously. There are costs and advantages associated with these two options, and to explore the selection between these two options, we apply a game-theoretical approach. We find the equilibrium strategies for two scenarios: (a) Alice and Eve have to decide the probability for which each can apply On/Off power strategies in choosing between eavesdropping and jamming options, (b) Alice and Eve tune transmission/jamming powers and Eve chooses either a single-level or bi-level mode for interfering with the Alice-Bob communication. We

AB - Physical layer secret communication is evaluated by the secrecy rate/capacity, which loosely is the Alice-Bob communication rate minus the Alice-Eve communication rate. Eve’s objective is to reduce the secrecy rate and typically this is accomplished by eavesdropping, but it also can be accomplished by Eve directing interference at Bob, reducing the Alice-Bob channel rate. We examine secret communication from Eve’s perspective, where she can either eavesdrop or jam, but not both simultaneously. There are costs and advantages associated with these two options, and to explore the selection between these two options, we apply a game-theoretical approach. We find the equilibrium strategies for two scenarios: (a) Alice and Eve have to decide the probability for which each can apply On/Off power strategies in choosing between eavesdropping and jamming options, (b) Alice and Eve tune transmission/jamming powers and Eve chooses either a single-level or bi-level mode for interfering with the Alice-Bob communication. We

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-04105-6_10

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-04105-6_10

M3 - Article

VL - 129

SP - 146

EP - 161

JO - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST

JF - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST

SN - 1867-8211

ER -

ID: 5773470