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Time-Inconsistency of Cooperative Networks in Differential Games. / Petrosyan, Leon; Панкратова, Ярославна Борисовна.

2025. 171-179 Paper presented at XXIV International conference Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research MOTOR 2025, Новосибирск, Russian Federation.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Harvard

Petrosyan, L & Панкратова, ЯБ 2025, 'Time-Inconsistency of Cooperative Networks in Differential Games', Paper presented at XXIV International conference Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research MOTOR 2025, Новосибирск, Russian Federation, 7/07/25 - 11/07/25 pp. 171-179. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-97077-1_12

APA

Petrosyan, L., & Панкратова, Я. Б. (2025). Time-Inconsistency of Cooperative Networks in Differential Games. 171-179. Paper presented at XXIV International conference Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research MOTOR 2025, Новосибирск, Russian Federation. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-97077-1_12

Vancouver

Petrosyan L, Панкратова ЯБ. Time-Inconsistency of Cooperative Networks in Differential Games. 2025. Paper presented at XXIV International conference Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research MOTOR 2025, Новосибирск, Russian Federation. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-97077-1_12

Author

Petrosyan, Leon ; Панкратова, Ярославна Борисовна. / Time-Inconsistency of Cooperative Networks in Differential Games. Paper presented at XXIV International conference Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research MOTOR 2025, Новосибирск, Russian Federation.9 p.

BibTeX

@conference{588644a3788e4911a470bff9e3e831d2,
title = "Time-Inconsistency of Cooperative Networks in Differential Games",
abstract = "In the paper, a cooperative differential network game is considered. We suppose that players choose simultaneously and independently the neighbors with whom they intend to interact during the game. Each player can choose neighbors from a fixed subset of players. Such subsets can be different for different players and, for each player, the number of its possible neighbors is limited. The players create the network to maximize the joint payoff. But the network that is optimal at the initial time instant may cease to be such afterwards. To avoid this, we propose an analogue of IDP (see [6])—payoff distribution procedure which changed the instantaneous payments of players, keeping the total payoff of players in the game under cooperation fixed (unchanged).",
author = "Leon Petrosyan and Панкратова, {Ярославна Борисовна}",
year = "2025",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-031-97077-1_12",
language = "English",
pages = "171--179",
note = "null ; Conference date: 07-07-2025 Through 11-07-2025",
url = "http://old.math.nsc.ru/conference/motor/2025/",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Time-Inconsistency of Cooperative Networks in Differential Games

AU - Petrosyan, Leon

AU - Панкратова, Ярославна Борисовна

PY - 2025

Y1 - 2025

N2 - In the paper, a cooperative differential network game is considered. We suppose that players choose simultaneously and independently the neighbors with whom they intend to interact during the game. Each player can choose neighbors from a fixed subset of players. Such subsets can be different for different players and, for each player, the number of its possible neighbors is limited. The players create the network to maximize the joint payoff. But the network that is optimal at the initial time instant may cease to be such afterwards. To avoid this, we propose an analogue of IDP (see [6])—payoff distribution procedure which changed the instantaneous payments of players, keeping the total payoff of players in the game under cooperation fixed (unchanged).

AB - In the paper, a cooperative differential network game is considered. We suppose that players choose simultaneously and independently the neighbors with whom they intend to interact during the game. Each player can choose neighbors from a fixed subset of players. Such subsets can be different for different players and, for each player, the number of its possible neighbors is limited. The players create the network to maximize the joint payoff. But the network that is optimal at the initial time instant may cease to be such afterwards. To avoid this, we propose an analogue of IDP (see [6])—payoff distribution procedure which changed the instantaneous payments of players, keeping the total payoff of players in the game under cooperation fixed (unchanged).

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-97077-1_12

DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-97077-1_12

M3 - Paper

SP - 171

EP - 179

Y2 - 7 July 2025 through 11 July 2025

ER -

ID: 137931017