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Time-Consistent Solutions for Two-Stage Network Games with Pairwise Interactions. / Petrosyan, Leon; Bulgakova, Mariia; Sedakov, Artem.

In: Mobile Networks and Applications, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2018, p. 491–500.

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@article{f9048db6d2c04d49aa5663dd633af0e8,
title = "Time-Consistent Solutions for Two-Stage Network Games with Pairwise Interactions",
abstract = "In the paper, we consider a cooperative version of a network game with pairwise interactions in which connected players play bimatrix games. For a particular type of a network, a simplified formula for the Shapley value based on a constructed characteristic function is derived. We then show the time inconsistency of classical cooperative solutions — the Shapley value and the core. The findings are applied to two important classes of bimatrix games: prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma and a coordination game.",
keywords = "pairwise interactions, cooperative games",
author = "Leon Petrosyan and Mariia Bulgakova and Artem Sedakov",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/s11036-018-1127-7",
language = "English",
volume = "26",
pages = "491–500",
journal = "Mobile Networks and Applications",
issn = "1383-469X",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Time-Consistent Solutions for Two-Stage Network Games with Pairwise Interactions

AU - Petrosyan, Leon

AU - Bulgakova, Mariia

AU - Sedakov, Artem

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - In the paper, we consider a cooperative version of a network game with pairwise interactions in which connected players play bimatrix games. For a particular type of a network, a simplified formula for the Shapley value based on a constructed characteristic function is derived. We then show the time inconsistency of classical cooperative solutions — the Shapley value and the core. The findings are applied to two important classes of bimatrix games: prisoner’s dilemma and a coordination game.

AB - In the paper, we consider a cooperative version of a network game with pairwise interactions in which connected players play bimatrix games. For a particular type of a network, a simplified formula for the Shapley value based on a constructed characteristic function is derived. We then show the time inconsistency of classical cooperative solutions — the Shapley value and the core. The findings are applied to two important classes of bimatrix games: prisoner’s dilemma and a coordination game.

KW - pairwise interactions

KW - cooperative games

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85053612837&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/fdc0f1ac-70f6-3c98-830b-30abcceb5cf1/

U2 - 10.1007/s11036-018-1127-7

DO - 10.1007/s11036-018-1127-7

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85053612837

VL - 26

SP - 491

EP - 500

JO - Mobile Networks and Applications

JF - Mobile Networks and Applications

SN - 1383-469X

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 35251145