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Time consistency and optimal-trajectory-subgame consistent economic optimization. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. 9780817682613. ed. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2012. p. 77-110 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; No. 9780817682613).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Yeung, DWK & Petrosyan, LA 2012, Time consistency and optimal-trajectory-subgame consistent economic optimization. in Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. 9780817682613 edn, Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, no. 9780817682613, Birkhäuser Verlag AG, pp. 77-110. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_4

APA

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2012). Time consistency and optimal-trajectory-subgame consistent economic optimization. In Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications (9780817682613 ed., pp. 77-110). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; No. 9780817682613). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_4

Vancouver

Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA. Time consistency and optimal-trajectory-subgame consistent economic optimization. In Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. 9780817682613 ed. Birkhäuser Verlag AG. 2012. p. 77-110. (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; 9780817682613). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_4

Author

Yeung, David W.K. ; Petrosyan, Leon A. / Time consistency and optimal-trajectory-subgame consistent economic optimization. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. 9780817682613. ed. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2012. pp. 77-110 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; 9780817682613).

BibTeX

@inbook{d3dcd3ebd92e48f8850708978694fe16,
title = "Time consistency and optimal-trajectory-subgame consistent economic optimization",
abstract = "The noncooperative games discussed in Chap. 2 fail to reflect all the facets of optimal behavior in n-person market games. In particular, equilibria in noncooperative games do not take into consideration Pareto efficiency or group optimality. Chapter 3 considers cooperation in economic optimization and it is shown that group optimality and individual rationality are two essential properties for cooperation. However, merely satisfying group optimality and individual rationality does not necessarily bring about a dynamically stable solution in economic cooperation because there is no guarantee that the agreed-upon optimality principle is fulfilled throughout the cooperative period. In this chapter we consider dynamically stable economic optimization.",
keywords = "Cooperative game, Cooperative strategy, Differential game, Optimality principle, Time consistency",
author = "Yeung, {David W.K.} and Petrosyan, {Leon A.}",
year = "2012",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_4",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-0-8176-8261-3",
series = "Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications",
publisher = "Birkh{\"a}user Verlag AG",
number = "9780817682613",
pages = "77--110",
booktitle = "Static and Dynamic Game Theory",
address = "Switzerland",
edition = "9780817682613",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Time consistency and optimal-trajectory-subgame consistent economic optimization

AU - Yeung, David W.K.

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

PY - 2012/1/1

Y1 - 2012/1/1

N2 - The noncooperative games discussed in Chap. 2 fail to reflect all the facets of optimal behavior in n-person market games. In particular, equilibria in noncooperative games do not take into consideration Pareto efficiency or group optimality. Chapter 3 considers cooperation in economic optimization and it is shown that group optimality and individual rationality are two essential properties for cooperation. However, merely satisfying group optimality and individual rationality does not necessarily bring about a dynamically stable solution in economic cooperation because there is no guarantee that the agreed-upon optimality principle is fulfilled throughout the cooperative period. In this chapter we consider dynamically stable economic optimization.

AB - The noncooperative games discussed in Chap. 2 fail to reflect all the facets of optimal behavior in n-person market games. In particular, equilibria in noncooperative games do not take into consideration Pareto efficiency or group optimality. Chapter 3 considers cooperation in economic optimization and it is shown that group optimality and individual rationality are two essential properties for cooperation. However, merely satisfying group optimality and individual rationality does not necessarily bring about a dynamically stable solution in economic cooperation because there is no guarantee that the agreed-upon optimality principle is fulfilled throughout the cooperative period. In this chapter we consider dynamically stable economic optimization.

KW - Cooperative game

KW - Cooperative strategy

KW - Differential game

KW - Optimality principle

KW - Time consistency

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85057538165&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_4

DO - 10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_4

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85057538165

SN - 978-0-8176-8261-3

T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications

SP - 77

EP - 110

BT - Static and Dynamic Game Theory

PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG

ER -

ID: 36952896