This paper focuses on ‘absolute’ relationships in private law that do not involve any influence exerted by persons - legal entities or individuals - on external items, whether tangible or otherwise. Such relationships are non-property in nature. Their specific feature is that they exist only as long as a person himself exists - in this respect, they are essentially ‘personal’. Therefore, the relationships in question may be classified as personal and non-property relationships. In such relationships, persons are interested in expressing their individuality, which makes it possible to treat such interest as an ‘absolute’ (i.e., available against the world at large) personal non-property right. This right is the right of personal freedom that requires that any conduct in which a person is engaged in the non-property sphere shall be protected by the law, with certain exceptions the law provides. The paper defines the right of personal freedom, describes its content and legal features, and demonstrates that this right is different from the general ability to have rights. The paper puts forward arguments to support the personal and not political nature of certain powers that comprise the right of personal freedom. The author presents both practical and theoretical arguments in favour of the right of personal freedom being introduced as a new concept both in legal scholarship and legislation.