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The Nature and Potential Applications of Contextual Definition in Philosophy of Law. / Ogleznev, Vitaly.

In: Filosofija, Sociologija, Vol. 32, No. 1, 24.01.2021, p. 23-31.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Ogleznev, V 2021, 'The Nature and Potential Applications of Contextual Definition in Philosophy of Law', Filosofija, Sociologija, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 23-31. https://doi.org/10.6001/fil-soc.v32i1.4376

APA

Ogleznev, V. (2021). The Nature and Potential Applications of Contextual Definition in Philosophy of Law. Filosofija, Sociologija, 32(1), 23-31. https://doi.org/10.6001/fil-soc.v32i1.4376

Vancouver

Ogleznev V. The Nature and Potential Applications of Contextual Definition in Philosophy of Law. Filosofija, Sociologija. 2021 Jan 24;32(1):23-31. https://doi.org/10.6001/fil-soc.v32i1.4376

Author

Ogleznev, Vitaly. / The Nature and Potential Applications of Contextual Definition in Philosophy of Law. In: Filosofija, Sociologija. 2021 ; Vol. 32, No. 1. pp. 23-31.

BibTeX

@article{08ec43aac5a14087885508d48c97b15f,
title = "The Nature and Potential Applications of Contextual Definition in Philosophy of Law",
abstract = "The paper analyses the nature and potential applications of contextual definitions in modern philosophy of language and jurisprudence. It is shown that the distinction be-tween a contextual definition and a genus–differentia definition proposed by some legal philosophers, where the latter is considered ineffective and unproductive in analyzing legal concepts, is sometimes deceptive. The weaknesses of the argument about this dis-tinction are shown by examining the constitutional legal rules, which can be considered an example of the application of contextual definitions in legal science. On the basis of this claim, it is shown that these two types of definition may well coexist at least in legal language and in some sense complement each other when different areas of their appli-cability are taken into account.",
keywords = "Context, Contextual definition, Genus-differentia definition, Legal language, Ordinary language, Rules",
author = "Vitaly Ogleznev",
note = "Funding Information: The work on this paper was supported by the Council for Grants of the President of the Russian Federation for State Support of Young Russian Scientists, Award Number MD-137.2020.6, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Lietuvos mokslų akademija, 2021. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2021",
month = jan,
day = "24",
doi = "10.6001/fil-soc.v32i1.4376",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "23--31",
journal = "Filosofija, Sociologija",
issn = "0235-7186",
publisher = "Lithuanian Academy of Sciences",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Nature and Potential Applications of Contextual Definition in Philosophy of Law

AU - Ogleznev, Vitaly

N1 - Funding Information: The work on this paper was supported by the Council for Grants of the President of the Russian Federation for State Support of Young Russian Scientists, Award Number MD-137.2020.6, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Publisher Copyright: © Lietuvos mokslų akademija, 2021. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2021/1/24

Y1 - 2021/1/24

N2 - The paper analyses the nature and potential applications of contextual definitions in modern philosophy of language and jurisprudence. It is shown that the distinction be-tween a contextual definition and a genus–differentia definition proposed by some legal philosophers, where the latter is considered ineffective and unproductive in analyzing legal concepts, is sometimes deceptive. The weaknesses of the argument about this dis-tinction are shown by examining the constitutional legal rules, which can be considered an example of the application of contextual definitions in legal science. On the basis of this claim, it is shown that these two types of definition may well coexist at least in legal language and in some sense complement each other when different areas of their appli-cability are taken into account.

AB - The paper analyses the nature and potential applications of contextual definitions in modern philosophy of language and jurisprudence. It is shown that the distinction be-tween a contextual definition and a genus–differentia definition proposed by some legal philosophers, where the latter is considered ineffective and unproductive in analyzing legal concepts, is sometimes deceptive. The weaknesses of the argument about this dis-tinction are shown by examining the constitutional legal rules, which can be considered an example of the application of contextual definitions in legal science. On the basis of this claim, it is shown that these two types of definition may well coexist at least in legal language and in some sense complement each other when different areas of their appli-cability are taken into account.

KW - Context

KW - Contextual definition

KW - Genus-differentia definition

KW - Legal language

KW - Ordinary language

KW - Rules

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85100822888&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/92eab1ab-98d9-364b-bcce-f9f96c57665b/

U2 - 10.6001/fil-soc.v32i1.4376

DO - 10.6001/fil-soc.v32i1.4376

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85100822888

VL - 32

SP - 23

EP - 31

JO - Filosofija, Sociologija

JF - Filosofija, Sociologija

SN - 0235-7186

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 71272587