The article discusses the experience of Michel Foucault's appeal to liberal economic theory, which became his way to avoid subject metaphysics and teleological history. The author shows how Foucault, after going through a series of searches in the 1960s, ascertained the death of a subject who had been a central figure in European philosophy since Descartes. For Foucault, this statement was a rejection of the metaphysics of the New Time and the definition of his place in history as a postmodern one. In his later works, Foucault replaces the sovereign subject with a multiple and pluralistic model of subjectivity. The transition from the register of the history of philosophy to the register of the history of ideas allowed him to move away from the metaphysics of the subject into the space of positive knowledge, but the methodology and ideological position of a historian of philosophy provided him immunity from teleological history. Thus, as the author demonstrates, Foucault represents a type of a nomadic intellectual who is constantly moving along the disciplinary grid, but simultaneously maintains conceptual and ideological constancy by virtue of his affiliation with a particular professional group. It can be quite reasonably argued that in Foucault's later works there was no resurrection of the subject, but there was a transfer of the problem of subjectivity to another register-from the register of metaphysics to the register of political economy. Using the term of Bruno Latour, we should recall his very insightful remark that transferring an instance from a register to a register also requires transferring the conceptual apparatus used to fix it, which inevitably leads to the transformation of the instance itself. This is what happens with Foucault's subject: moving from the register of philosophy to the register of political economy, the subject transforms in such a way that the criticism addressed to him in the philosophical register does not reach him. In an effort to get away from subject metaphysics and teleological history, Foucault transforms the register of the history of philosophy into the register of the history of ideas, which allows him to leave behind a number of questions of philosophical order, the development of which implies the metaphysics Foucault wanted to discard. Engaged in the history of ideas, Foucault remains a historian of philosophy with regard to the method and goals, which provides him with immunity from the inborn vices of historical science.