The euler-equation approach in average-oriented opinion dynamics

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The euler-equation approach in average-oriented opinion dynamics. / Mazalov, Vladimir; Parilina, Elena.

In: Mathematics, Vol. 8, No. 3, 355, 01.03.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

BibTeX

@article{9656b96b2167410690461e1d905a72a5,

title = "The euler-equation approach in average-oriented opinion dynamics",

abstract = "We consider the models of average-oriented opinion dynamics. An opinion about an event is distributed among the agents of a social network. There are an optimization problem and two game-theoretical models when players as centers of influence aim to make the opinions of the agents closer to the target ones in a finite time horizon minimizing their costs. The optimization problem and the games of competition for the agents' opinion are linear-quadratic and solved using the Euler-equation approach. The optimal strategies for optimization problem and the Nash equilibria in the open-loop strategies for the games are found. Numerical simulations demonstrate theoretical results.",

keywords = "Consensus, Euler-equation approach, Linear-quadratic games, Opinion dynamics",

author = "Vladimir Mazalov and Elena Parilina",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 by the authors.",

year = "2020",

month = mar,

day = "1",

doi = "10.3390/math8030355",

language = "English",

volume = "8",

journal = "Mathematics",

issn = "2227-7390",

publisher = "MDPI AG",

number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The euler-equation approach in average-oriented opinion dynamics

AU - Mazalov, Vladimir

AU - Parilina, Elena

PY - 2020/3/1

Y1 - 2020/3/1

N2 - We consider the models of average-oriented opinion dynamics. An opinion about an event is distributed among the agents of a social network. There are an optimization problem and two game-theoretical models when players as centers of influence aim to make the opinions of the agents closer to the target ones in a finite time horizon minimizing their costs. The optimization problem and the games of competition for the agents' opinion are linear-quadratic and solved using the Euler-equation approach. The optimal strategies for optimization problem and the Nash equilibria in the open-loop strategies for the games are found. Numerical simulations demonstrate theoretical results.

AB - We consider the models of average-oriented opinion dynamics. An opinion about an event is distributed among the agents of a social network. There are an optimization problem and two game-theoretical models when players as centers of influence aim to make the opinions of the agents closer to the target ones in a finite time horizon minimizing their costs. The optimization problem and the games of competition for the agents' opinion are linear-quadratic and solved using the Euler-equation approach. The optimal strategies for optimization problem and the Nash equilibria in the open-loop strategies for the games are found. Numerical simulations demonstrate theoretical results.

KW - Consensus

KW - Euler-equation approach

KW - Linear-quadratic games

KW - Opinion dynamics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85082430389&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.3390/math8030355

DO - 10.3390/math8030355

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85082430389

VL - 8

JO - Mathematics

JF - Mathematics

SN - 2227-7390

IS - 3

M1 - 355

ER -

ID: 52686035