Standard

The bargaining solution among threshold strategies. / Mazalov, V. V.; Kondratev, A. Y.

In: Automation and Remote Control, Vol. 76, No. 3, 2015, p. 507-520.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Mazalov, VV & Kondratev, AY 2015, 'The bargaining solution among threshold strategies', Automation and Remote Control, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 507-520. https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915030157

APA

Mazalov, V. V., & Kondratev, A. Y. (2015). The bargaining solution among threshold strategies. Automation and Remote Control, 76(3), 507-520. https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915030157

Vancouver

Mazalov VV, Kondratev AY. The bargaining solution among threshold strategies. Automation and Remote Control. 2015;76(3):507-520. https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915030157

Author

Mazalov, V. V. ; Kondratev, A. Y. / The bargaining solution among threshold strategies. In: Automation and Remote Control. 2015 ; Vol. 76, No. 3. pp. 507-520.

BibTeX

@article{24967218025747b8897bdff1890c5b42,
title = "The bargaining solution among threshold strategies",
abstract = "We consider a bargaining problem which engages a seller (player I) and a buyer (player II). Each player possesses private information about own reservation price which is unavailable to the opponent. Players appear on the market and announce their prices for a product. If the transaction takes place then the gain of a player is the difference between the negotiated and the reservation prices. We find the equilibrium in this game among threshold strategies.",
author = "Mazalov, {V. V.} and Kondratev, {A. Y.}",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1134/S0005117915030157",
language = "русский",
volume = "76",
pages = "507--520",
journal = "Automation and Remote Control",
issn = "0005-1179",
publisher = "МАИК {"}Наука/Интерпериодика{"}",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The bargaining solution among threshold strategies

AU - Mazalov, V. V.

AU - Kondratev, A. Y.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - We consider a bargaining problem which engages a seller (player I) and a buyer (player II). Each player possesses private information about own reservation price which is unavailable to the opponent. Players appear on the market and announce their prices for a product. If the transaction takes place then the gain of a player is the difference between the negotiated and the reservation prices. We find the equilibrium in this game among threshold strategies.

AB - We consider a bargaining problem which engages a seller (player I) and a buyer (player II). Each player possesses private information about own reservation price which is unavailable to the opponent. Players appear on the market and announce their prices for a product. If the transaction takes place then the gain of a player is the difference between the negotiated and the reservation prices. We find the equilibrium in this game among threshold strategies.

U2 - 10.1134/S0005117915030157

DO - 10.1134/S0005117915030157

M3 - статья

VL - 76

SP - 507

EP - 520

JO - Automation and Remote Control

JF - Automation and Remote Control

SN - 0005-1179

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 132810859