Tautologies, inferential processes and constraints on evoked knowledge

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Tautologies, inferential processes and constraints on evoked knowledge. / Vilinbakhova, Elena; Escandell-Vidal, Victoria; Zevakhina, Natalia.

In: Journal of Pragmatics, Vol. 191, 04.2022, p. 55-66.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Author

Vilinbakhova, Elena ; Escandell-Vidal, Victoria ; Zevakhina, Natalia. / Tautologies, inferential processes and constraints on evoked knowledge. In: Journal of Pragmatics. 2022 ; Vol. 191. pp. 55-66.

BibTeX

@article{b38680c2ac6a4d3c85627da72b7ebdd6,

title = "Tautologies, inferential processes and constraints on evoked knowledge",

abstract = "In the literature on nominal tautologies, it is assumed that common knowledge is a crucial ingredient for their interpretation. This paper explores a different approach: we argue that invoking shared knowledge is at the same time too strict and too vague as a condition for the understanding of tautologies in context. More specifically, we claim that, on the one hand, the hearer's previous knowledge about some specific set of properties of the entity referred to in the tautology is not always necessary: lack of previous knowledge can be repaired by accommodating new assumptions or compensated by providing additional explicit content in discourse. On the other hand, the hearer's previous knowledge about some specific set of properties of the entity referred to in the tautology is not always sufficient: only permanent, classificatory properties can be evoked by a tautology; transitory states, by contrast, are systematically rejected, even if they constitute shared knowledge and are supported by the context. We provide evidence for our claims both from the corpus study, analysing examples of tautologies with proper names from COCA and web-based sources, and experimental study designed as a verification task, additionally measuring reaction times for replying to a given question.",

keywords = "Common knowledge, ILP/SLP distinction, Interpretive strategies, Tautologies, BOYS WILL, SLP distinction, ILP, SENTENCES",

author = "Elena Vilinbakhova and Victoria Escandell-Vidal and Natalia Zevakhina",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2022",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1016/j.pragma.2022.02.001",

language = "English",

volume = "191",

pages = "55--66",

journal = "Journal of Pragmatics",

issn = "0378-2166",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Tautologies, inferential processes and constraints on evoked knowledge

AU - Vilinbakhova, Elena

AU - Escandell-Vidal, Victoria

AU - Zevakhina, Natalia

PY - 2022/4

Y1 - 2022/4

N2 - In the literature on nominal tautologies, it is assumed that common knowledge is a crucial ingredient for their interpretation. This paper explores a different approach: we argue that invoking shared knowledge is at the same time too strict and too vague as a condition for the understanding of tautologies in context. More specifically, we claim that, on the one hand, the hearer's previous knowledge about some specific set of properties of the entity referred to in the tautology is not always necessary: lack of previous knowledge can be repaired by accommodating new assumptions or compensated by providing additional explicit content in discourse. On the other hand, the hearer's previous knowledge about some specific set of properties of the entity referred to in the tautology is not always sufficient: only permanent, classificatory properties can be evoked by a tautology; transitory states, by contrast, are systematically rejected, even if they constitute shared knowledge and are supported by the context. We provide evidence for our claims both from the corpus study, analysing examples of tautologies with proper names from COCA and web-based sources, and experimental study designed as a verification task, additionally measuring reaction times for replying to a given question.

AB - In the literature on nominal tautologies, it is assumed that common knowledge is a crucial ingredient for their interpretation. This paper explores a different approach: we argue that invoking shared knowledge is at the same time too strict and too vague as a condition for the understanding of tautologies in context. More specifically, we claim that, on the one hand, the hearer's previous knowledge about some specific set of properties of the entity referred to in the tautology is not always necessary: lack of previous knowledge can be repaired by accommodating new assumptions or compensated by providing additional explicit content in discourse. On the other hand, the hearer's previous knowledge about some specific set of properties of the entity referred to in the tautology is not always sufficient: only permanent, classificatory properties can be evoked by a tautology; transitory states, by contrast, are systematically rejected, even if they constitute shared knowledge and are supported by the context. We provide evidence for our claims both from the corpus study, analysing examples of tautologies with proper names from COCA and web-based sources, and experimental study designed as a verification task, additionally measuring reaction times for replying to a given question.

KW - Common knowledge

KW - ILP/SLP distinction

KW - Interpretive strategies

KW - Tautologies

KW - BOYS WILL

KW - SLP distinction

KW - ILP

KW - SENTENCES

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124726006&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/a7439daf-fbe5-34fd-a8bb-c5eb5da6f050/

U2 - 10.1016/j.pragma.2022.02.001

DO - 10.1016/j.pragma.2022.02.001

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85124726006

VL - 191

SP - 55

EP - 66

JO - Journal of Pragmatics

JF - Journal of Pragmatics

SN - 0378-2166

ER -

ID: 93021342