Standard

Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game. / Zenkevich, N.; Zyatchin, A.

In: International Game Theory Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014, p. 1450013-1 - 1450013-13.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Harvard

Zenkevich, N & Zyatchin, A 2014, 'Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game', International Game Theory Review, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 1450013-1 - 1450013-13. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198914500133

APA

Zenkevich, N., & Zyatchin, A. (2014). Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game. International Game Theory Review, 16(2), 1450013-1 - 1450013-13. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198914500133

Vancouver

Zenkevich N, Zyatchin A. Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game. International Game Theory Review. 2014;16(2):1450013-1 - 1450013-13. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198914500133

Author

Zenkevich, N. ; Zyatchin, A. / Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game. In: International Game Theory Review. 2014 ; Vol. 16, No. 2. pp. 1450013-1 - 1450013-13.

BibTeX

@article{7bce2cf2106844a9afc56a2c630fdc17,
title = "Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game",
abstract = "This paper introduces an extension of the vehicle routing problem by including several distributors in competition. Each customer is characterized by demand and a wholesale price. Under this scenario a solution may have unserviced customers and elementary routes with no customer visits. The problem is described as a vehicle routing game (VRG) with coordinated strategies. We provide a computable procedure to calculate a strong equilibrium (SE) in the VRG that is stable against deviations from any coalition. Following this procedure, we solve iteratively optimization subproblems for a single distributor, reducing the set of unserviced customers at each iteration. We prove that strong equilibria of one type exist for a VRG, and we provide conditions for another type to exist. We also introduce a semi-cooperative SE that helps reduce a set of strong equilibria in the VRG. Our methodology is suited for parallel computing, and could be efficiently applied to routing vehicles with a few compartments. It also calcula",
keywords = "game theory, combinatorial optimization, graph theory, networks, vehicle routing problem, РИНЦ, SCOPUS",
author = "N. Zenkevich and A. Zyatchin",
note = "Zenkevich, N. Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game [electronic ressource] / N. Zenkevich, N. Zyatchin // International Game Theory Review. - 2014. - Vol. 16, № 2. - URL: https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198914500133?src=recsys& ",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1142/S0219198914500133",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
pages = "1450013--1 -- 1450013--13",
journal = "International Game Theory Review",
issn = "0219-1989",
publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game

AU - Zenkevich, N.

AU - Zyatchin, A.

N1 - Zenkevich, N. Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game [electronic ressource] / N. Zenkevich, N. Zyatchin // International Game Theory Review. - 2014. - Vol. 16, № 2. - URL: https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198914500133?src=recsys&

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This paper introduces an extension of the vehicle routing problem by including several distributors in competition. Each customer is characterized by demand and a wholesale price. Under this scenario a solution may have unserviced customers and elementary routes with no customer visits. The problem is described as a vehicle routing game (VRG) with coordinated strategies. We provide a computable procedure to calculate a strong equilibrium (SE) in the VRG that is stable against deviations from any coalition. Following this procedure, we solve iteratively optimization subproblems for a single distributor, reducing the set of unserviced customers at each iteration. We prove that strong equilibria of one type exist for a VRG, and we provide conditions for another type to exist. We also introduce a semi-cooperative SE that helps reduce a set of strong equilibria in the VRG. Our methodology is suited for parallel computing, and could be efficiently applied to routing vehicles with a few compartments. It also calcula

AB - This paper introduces an extension of the vehicle routing problem by including several distributors in competition. Each customer is characterized by demand and a wholesale price. Under this scenario a solution may have unserviced customers and elementary routes with no customer visits. The problem is described as a vehicle routing game (VRG) with coordinated strategies. We provide a computable procedure to calculate a strong equilibrium (SE) in the VRG that is stable against deviations from any coalition. Following this procedure, we solve iteratively optimization subproblems for a single distributor, reducing the set of unserviced customers at each iteration. We prove that strong equilibria of one type exist for a VRG, and we provide conditions for another type to exist. We also introduce a semi-cooperative SE that helps reduce a set of strong equilibria in the VRG. Our methodology is suited for parallel computing, and could be efficiently applied to routing vehicles with a few compartments. It also calcula

KW - game theory

KW - combinatorial optimization

KW - graph theory

KW - networks

KW - vehicle routing problem

KW - РИНЦ

KW - SCOPUS

U2 - 10.1142/S0219198914500133

DO - 10.1142/S0219198914500133

M3 - Article

VL - 16

SP - 1450013-1 - 1450013-13

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 7028417