Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Strong coalitional equilibrium in a transportation game. / Zenkevich, N. A.; Zyatchin, A. V.
In: Automation and Remote Control, Vol. 78, No. 10, 10.2017, p. 1909-1919.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Strong coalitional equilibrium in a transportation game
AU - Zenkevich, N. A.
AU - Zyatchin, A. V.
N1 - Zenkevich, N. A. Strong coalitional equilibrium in a transportation game / N. A. Zenkevich, A. V. Zyatchin // Automation and Remote Control. - 2017 . – Volume 78, Issue 10. – P. 1909-1919.
PY - 2017/10
Y1 - 2017/10
N2 - This paper introduces an extension of the vehicle routing problem by involving several decision makers in competition. Each customer is characterized by demand and distance to the warehouse. The problem is described in form of a cooperative transportation game (CTG). We consider customers as players in the game. Their strategies are the routes for a vehicle they should rent in a coalition to deliver goods subject to their demand with minimal transportation costs, under the assumption that transportation costs are allocated between the players according to the Nash arbitration scheme. For each profile in coalitional strategies, we define a coalitional structure of players and the costs of each player. A strong equilibrium is found for the cooperative transportation game. In addition, we develop a procedure to calculate the strong equilibrium. This procedure is illustrated by a numerical example.
AB - This paper introduces an extension of the vehicle routing problem by involving several decision makers in competition. Each customer is characterized by demand and distance to the warehouse. The problem is described in form of a cooperative transportation game (CTG). We consider customers as players in the game. Their strategies are the routes for a vehicle they should rent in a coalition to deliver goods subject to their demand with minimal transportation costs, under the assumption that transportation costs are allocated between the players according to the Nash arbitration scheme. For each profile in coalitional strategies, we define a coalitional structure of players and the costs of each player. A strong equilibrium is found for the cooperative transportation game. In addition, we develop a procedure to calculate the strong equilibrium. This procedure is illustrated by a numerical example.
KW - transportation game
KW - coalitional structure
KW - WOS
KW - SCOPUS
KW - WOS
KW - SCOPUS
U2 - 10.1134/S0005117917100137
DO - 10.1134/S0005117917100137
M3 - Article
VL - 78
SP - 1909
EP - 1919
JO - Automation and Remote Control
JF - Automation and Remote Control
SN - 0005-1179
IS - 10
ER -
ID: 9373040