Strategic analysis of the Russian crab quota auction in 2019

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Strategic analysis of the Russian crab quota auction in 2019. / Kalinin, Nikita; Vershinin, Mark.

In: Marine Policy, Vol. 122, 104266, 12.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

BibTeX

@article{76d0cc09035a44aa9916972d85ef8f58,

title = "Strategic analysis of the Russian crab quota auction in 2019",

abstract = "The distribution of natural resources such as fish or forest, among many others, is an everyday political, economic, and ecological issue. Auctions are a possible alternative for grandfathering (historical rights). As many economists believe, an auction is the most efficient procedure to distribute quotas for resources. In 2019, the auction for Russian crab quotas yielded the largest revenue (more than 2 bln. euros) among world auctions, except for spectrum auctions. We analyse the strategic behavior of its participants and propose a better scheme of auction which is more favorable for newcomers and small companies, and potentially generates more revenue (up to 40% on 19 out of 31 lots) for the government.",

keywords = "Auction, Crab quotas, Game theory, Grandfathering, Strategic analysis",

author = "Nikita Kalinin and Mark Vershinin",

note = "Funding Information: orcid(s): 0000-0002-1613-5175. Supported in part by Young Russian Mathematics award. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Elsevier Ltd Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",

year = "2020",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104266",

language = "English",

volume = "122",

journal = "Marine Policy",

issn = "0308-597X",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic analysis of the Russian crab quota auction in 2019

AU - Kalinin, Nikita

AU - Vershinin, Mark

N1 - Funding Information: orcid(s): 0000-0002-1613-5175. Supported in part by Young Russian Mathematics award. Publisher Copyright: © 2020 Elsevier Ltd Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2020/12

Y1 - 2020/12

N2 - The distribution of natural resources such as fish or forest, among many others, is an everyday political, economic, and ecological issue. Auctions are a possible alternative for grandfathering (historical rights). As many economists believe, an auction is the most efficient procedure to distribute quotas for resources. In 2019, the auction for Russian crab quotas yielded the largest revenue (more than 2 bln. euros) among world auctions, except for spectrum auctions. We analyse the strategic behavior of its participants and propose a better scheme of auction which is more favorable for newcomers and small companies, and potentially generates more revenue (up to 40% on 19 out of 31 lots) for the government.

AB - The distribution of natural resources such as fish or forest, among many others, is an everyday political, economic, and ecological issue. Auctions are a possible alternative for grandfathering (historical rights). As many economists believe, an auction is the most efficient procedure to distribute quotas for resources. In 2019, the auction for Russian crab quotas yielded the largest revenue (more than 2 bln. euros) among world auctions, except for spectrum auctions. We analyse the strategic behavior of its participants and propose a better scheme of auction which is more favorable for newcomers and small companies, and potentially generates more revenue (up to 40% on 19 out of 31 lots) for the government.

KW - Auction

KW - Crab quotas

KW - Game theory

KW - Grandfathering

KW - Strategic analysis

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85094605797&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/fe2e2a55-4288-3204-9736-e1dc8436a799/

U2 - 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104266

DO - 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104266

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85094605797

VL - 122

JO - Marine Policy

JF - Marine Policy

SN - 0308-597X

M1 - 104266

ER -

ID: 70715588